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TREATING PERSONS AS ENDS IN THEMSELVES: THE
LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF A KANTIAN PRINCIPLE
R. George Wright*
I. INTRODUCTION
In one of the most stirring passages in modern ethics, Imman-
uel Kant famously enjoins: "act that you use humanity, whether
in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the
same time as an end, never merely as a means."1 Precisely what
Kant means here, however, is not entirely clear.2 More than one
interpretation of this formula is possible.' But the importance of
Kant's "formula of ends" in modern moral philosophy is impossi-
ble to deny.4
What this basic moral principle implies for the law, and
whether the law properly respects this basic moral principle, are
the concerns of this article. Kant saw important differences be-
* Professor, Indiana University School of Law, Indianapolis.
L IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 38 (Mary
Gregor ed. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1998) (1785) [hereinafter KANT,
GROUNDWORK]. This and related formulations have been quoted and discussed frequently.
See, e.g., Thomas E. Hill, Jr., Humanity as an End in Itself, 91 ETHIcS 84, 84 (1980).
2. See KANT, GROUNDWORK, supra note 1, at 96; ROBERT PAUL WOLFF, THE
AUTONOMY OF REASON: A COhMENTARY ON KANT'S GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF
MORALS 175 (1973) (stating that it is very difficult to tell what Kant means by the injunc-
tion to treat humanity as an end in itself); Eric Rakowski, Taking and Saving Lives, 93
COLUi. L. REv. 1063, 1074 (1993) (describing Kantian formulation as seeming "to label
the point rather than explain it").
3. See Wendy J. Gordon, Truth and Consequences: The Force of Blackmail's Central
Case, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1741, 1761 n.97 (1993) (referring to Kant's formulation as "open
to many differing interpretations"); Hill, supra note 1, at 84.
4. See William Ewald, Comparative Jurisprudence (1): What Was it Like to Try a
Rat?, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1889, 2001 (1995) (describing this formulation of the Kantian
Categorical Imperative as "the most important and influential for the philosophy of law");
Hill, supra note 1, at 84; David Morris Phillips, The Commercial Culpability Scale, 92
YALE L.J. 228, 254 n.110 (1982) (quoting ALAN DONAGAN, THE THEORY OF MORALITY 229
(1977) and describing this version of the Categorical Imperative as -the fundamental
principle of common morality").
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tween the spheres of law and morality.5 He recognized that it is
difficult, if not impossible, for the law to coerce us into doing the
morally right thing from the right motive.6 The law should, how-
ever, take proper account of the Kantian formula.
Part II discusses Kant's formula of ends. The remaining sec-
tions test the adequacy of the law's response to Kant's formula.
This article does not refer to every area of the law that embodies
or conflicts with the Kantian formula, but it does, however, dis-
cuss several areas of the law that support the Kantian principle
and other areas that do not.
In particular, this article focuses on deterrence theories of
criminal punishment, the law of commercial appropriation of
likeness or identity, sexual harassment, human cloning, and the
law of rescues.7 The law of rescues brings to the forefront what
others have labeled the positive, or affirmative, duty side of the
Kantian formula of ends. Next, the article considers what this
positive dimension of Kant's formula of ends tells us about the
law of welfare and the right to education.8
Ultimately, the article concludes that the formula's encounter
with the law helps to further clarify the strengths and limits of
the possible interpretations of the formula. More importantly,
Kant's formula of ends, especially in its positive dimensions, casts
5. See, e.g., IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 31 (Mary Gregor ed. &
trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1996) (1797) [hereinafter KANT, METAPHYSICS] (stating
that the law cannot choose an end for a person, even when it requires or forbids particular
acts); see also HANNAH ARENDT, LECTURES ON KANT'S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 8 (Ronald
Beiner ed. 1982) (suggesting that "if we want to study the philosophy of law in general, we
certainly shall not turn to Kant"); Anthony M. Dillof, Punishing Bias: An Examination of
the Theoretical Foundations of Bias Crime Statutes, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1015, 1026 n.29
(1997) (concluding that Kant does not require this principle to include fidelity for a law to
be valid, notwithstanding the intuitive appeal of the principle in at least some contexts);
Kenneth W. Simons, The Puzzling Doctrine of Contributory Negligence, 16 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1693, 1713-14 n.52 (1995) (discussing the independence of Kant's moral theory from
his legal theory, but maintaining the value of considering Kant's moral theory in ground-
ing our legal duties); Ernest J. Weinrib, Law as a Kantian Idea of Reason, 87 COLUM. L.
REv. 472, 473 (1987) (stating that "[s]uch Kantianism as exists in contemporary legal
thought takes its bearings from Kant's ethical rather than from his legal philosophy").
6. See David Cummiskey, Kantian Consequentialism, 100 ETHICS 586, 604-05 (1990)
(discussing KANT, METAPHYSICS, supra note 5, at 31). Certainly one can be legally re-
quired to provide certain opportunities for another person, or to promote the other person's
rational development, without subjectively respecting that other person. The law often re-
quires us to do what some remain unwilling to freely do, as Kant recognizes. See id.
7. See infra Parts IV.A-E.
8. See infra Part IV.F.
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serious doubt on the moral adequacy of the current law of welfare
and education. The law can and should do more to promote the
development of the rational capacities we all possess, regardless
of our individual economic circumstances. Thus, the Kantian for-
mula of ends is not simply an Enlightenment milestone, but an
important and unmet challenge to the law.
II. CLARIFYING THE KANTIAN FORMULA: SOME PRELIMINARY
ISSUES
Kant's formula of ends is one of several formulas that Kant be-
lieves to be different expressions of the same underlying idea.9
The alternative formulas focus on other dimensions of morality.
10
This article focuses on Kant's formula of ends." A close look at
this formula raises several interpretive issues. First, the formula
of ends discusses how one should "treat" someone or something.
The idea of "treating" requires clarification. Treating someone or
something in a particular way may suggest that someone has
taken some affirmative action, or it may mean that someone pas-
sively treats a person with disdain or even contempt.
In order to treat "humanity" in some particular way, humanity
must be defined. In discussing humanity, Kant introduces the
idea of "personhood"-one's own person and the personhood of
someone else-as closely related to humanity. What is the rela-
tion between humanity and personhood? Whatever the object of
our treatment is, that object must be treated not merely as a
means, but, presumably in the same action, also as an end.
Most people appreciate the idea of treating someone as a
means, and perhaps even as a mere means. Likewise, most people
are familiar with the idea of treating someone as an object. Is
treating someone as an object always the same as treating some-
9. See KANT, GROUNDWORK, supra note 1, at 103.
10. See id. at 88-101. The alternative formulations of the Categorical Imperative ask
us, in turn, to assume that the maxim or principle underlying one's contemplated action,
through one's will, become universalized as a law of nature; to assume that one's will is,
through the maxims underlying one's actions, thereby generating universal law; or to as-
sume that through one's maxims, one is making law as a member of a sort of republic or
realm of ends. This article does not focus on these alternative formulas.
11. This formulation appears as only one among the four alternative formulations of
what Kant refers to as the Categorical Imperative. See, e.g., Hill, supra note 1, at 84.
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one merely as a means? Are people sometimes treated as mere ob-
jects, but not as a means toward any goal? To answer these ques-
tions, this article must clarify the difference between treating
someone as a means and treating someone merely as a means.
Kant believes this distinction depends on whether the relevant
"humanity," "person," or "personhood" has been treated as an end,
as well as a means. While evocative, it is not clear language. Peo-
ple do not commonly refer to a person as an end, or as an end in
herself. Therefore, this article must clarify how a person is an
end, a goal, or an aim.
In piecing together a plausible understanding of Kant's formula
of ends, this article makes no claim to have arrived at the under-
standing that Kant intended. Any such claims are hopelessly in-
determinate. In any event, this article's goal is to construct a use-
ful understanding of Kant's formula of each, rather than one that
would have met with Kant's approval.
Similarly, this article does not assess the ultimate merits of
Kant's formula of ends as moral philosophy. The article is limited
to relying on the intuitive appeal, evocativeness, power, influence,
and popularity of the Kantian formula of ends in critiquing the
law.
Perhaps the leading current exponent of broadly Kantian moral
theory is John Rawls. Rawls offers the following view of Kant's
use of the term humanity:
Kant means by humanity those of our powers and capacities that
characterize us as reasonable and rational persons who belong to the
natural world .... These powers include, first, those of moral per-
sonality, which make it possible for us to have a good will and a good
moral character; and second, those capacities and skills to be devel-
oped by culture: by the arts and sciences and so forth. 12
Humanity, for Kant, thus focuses crucially on people's rational
capacities, 3 including their ability to make rational choices re-
garding what is deeply valuable or worthy. 4 If people have the
capacity to make rational moral choices freely, autonomously, and
12. JOHN RAWLS, LEcTuREs ON THE HISTORY OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 188 (Barbara
Herman ed. 2000).
13. See CHRISTINE M. KORSGAARD, CREATING THE KINGDOM OF ENDS 110 (1996) ("In
the Groundwork, Kant interchanges the terms 'humanity' and 'rational nature.'").
14. See id. at 114.
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self-originatingly, 5 beyond being pulled about mechanically by
the tugs of nature, that capacity will be the source and embodi-
ment of moral worth, dignity, and their status as ends in them-
selves.
Thus, to the extent that they are capable of free and autono-
mous thinking and of genuine moral deliberation, 6 people possess
dignity, or worth, as ends in themselves. 7 As Rawls suggests, if
mankind can avoid having natural and social desires dictating
their actions, and if people are capable of rational moral willing,
they are ends in themselves.'"
For Kant, the existence of the developed or undeveloped capac-
ity for rational willing is not a matter of degree among persons.
The bare existence of this capacity, and people's existence as ends
in themselves, does not vary from person to person. 9 It is there-
fore, among persons, a matter of commonality rather than dis-
tinction. ° Professor Allen Wood writes that for Kant, "[the worth
of all rational beings is equal."2' A person born to poverty is not
lower on some scale of crucial moral worth than a person born to
wealth. This is not to say, of course, that people are equal in the
opportunities society gives them to develop their rational capaci-
ties. Nor is it to say that the bare minimal capacity for rationality
is all that matters.
To say that people are equal in basic worth differs from saying
that their worth as humans is incomparable or incommensurable.
Equality is not incomparability. It is, for example, more tempting
to somehow trade off one person for another if they are considered
15. See BARBARA HERMAN, THE PRACTICE OF MORAL JUDGMENT 238 (1993).
16. See HENRYE. ALLISON, KANT'S THEORY OF FREEDOM 221 (1990).
17. See HERMIAN, supra note 15, at 237.
18. See RAWLS, supra note 12, at 196. Raising a terminological issue, Allen Wood has
observed that "[s]trictly speaking... Kant ascribes dignity not to 'humanity' but to 'per-
sonality,' that is, not to rational nature in general but to rational nature in its capacity to
be morally self-legislative." ALLEN W. WOOD, KANT'S ETHICAL THOUGHT 115 (1999). Some
of the discussions above simply focus on humanity insofar as it is capable of rational moral
willing. This article sets Wood's distinction aside.
19. See THOMAS E. HILL, JR., DIGNITY AND PRACTICAL REASON IN KANT'S MORAL
THEORY 61 (1992).
20. See id. Despite this, Kant does not recognize humanity, or the capacity for rational
moral legislation, in non-human animals. See id.; see also IMANUEL KANT, LECTURES ON
ETHICS 239 (Louis Infield trans. 1963) (1930). For a discussion of intermediate possibili-
ties between persons and things, see, e.g., ONORA O'NEILL, CONSTRUCTIONS OF REASON:
EXPLORATIONS OF KANT'S PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY 138 n.11 (1989).
21. WOOD, supra note 18, at 132.
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basically "equal." People may be less tempted, however, to trade
off one person for another if each person is of literally irreplace-
able or incomparable value.
Of course, Kant cannot escape from difficult cases of classifica-
tion. For Kant, mature members of our species, who are not se-
verely mentally incapacitated, count among rational humanity.'
But inevitably there are difficult cases of classification. Vulcans,
though, may be mildly gratified to learn that Kant's category of
"humanity" is not exclusive to members of the human species.
Any species whose capacity for rational moral willing meets
Kant's criteria may be recognized as dignified ends in them-
selves."
As an end, worth in one's self is thus equal, or more precisely,
incomparable among persons, as well as being objective, intrinsic,
and absolute. As Professor Roger Sullivan observed, for Kant,
"Er]espect is an attitude due equally to every person,... regard-
less of social position, occupational role, learning, wealth, or any
other special qualities or talents he or she may or may not pos-
sess."24 Respecting people is also not a matter left to anyone's dis-
cretion or preference.
This basic dignity attaches because of mankind's mere capacity
for rational moral willing, and not because a person actually does
the right thing or acts from the right motive.25 Kant, of course,
recognizes a crucial moral difference between good and bad con-
duct. Put simply, good conduct expresses proper respect for hu-
manity, whereas bad conduct expresses disrespect or contempt.
Failing to respect humanity as an end in itself uses that absolute
22. See id. at 119. Kant recognizes a moral duty to restore humanity where we can.
See id. at 144 ("We surely would dishonor rational nature if we did not cherish its devel-
opment in children or failed to strive for its recovery in men and women who have tempo-
rarily lost it.").
23. See id. at 119.
24. ROGER J. SULLIVAN, IMMANUEL KANT'S MORAL THEORY 197 (1989). This is not to
suggest that Kant did not attach moral and legal weight to various sorts of social hierar-
chies in other respects. See, e.g., WOOD, supra note 18, at 138 ("[The equality of all ra-
tional beings does not entail that they must be treated exactly alike in any particular re-
spect.").
25. See SULLIVAN, supra note 24, at 120; see also KORSGAARD, supra note 13, at 124;
WOOD, supra note 18, at 120 ("[Rational beings cannot be ends in themselves only insofar
as they are virtuous or obedient to moral laws.").
26. See SULLIVAN, supra note 24, at 120.
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worth as a means to some goal that has a mere "price," 2' as dis-
tinguished from dignity. As well, "[w]henever we immorally cater
to our inclinations, we violate our integrity by treating ourselves
and others as mere things, as of only instrumental value."28 But
Kantian basic respect is not owed to persons only when they do
the right thing.
29
Kant has no general objection to using people, or to using them
as a means. Life could hardly be possible otherwise. The Kant
scholar H. J. Paton points out that "[elvery time we post a letter,
we use post-office officials as a means, but we do not use them
simply as a means."' The critical difference is between treating a
person merely as a means, and treating a person as a means and
at the same time as an end.3 This is partly a matter of act and of
intention, and further, a person's intentions may not always be
clear in the realm of morality or of law.
It is crucial to think about what might be called the affirmative
dimension of Kant's formula, as distinct from its merely negative
or passively fulfilled dimension. The Kantian formula of ends
cannot always be fulfilled by keeping our distance, or by indiffer-
ence to other rational agents or potential rational agents. The
Kantian formula of ends requires not only a refusal to murder,
but a willingness to actively participate and assist others in af-
firmative mutual support.32
Therefore, we must go beyond mere negative duties of not in-
terfering with refraining from injury; we must act affirmatively to
help others.33 Kant holds that our moral duty is, in part, to seek
to perfect our own moral virtue.34 With regard to others, however,
27. WOOD, supra note 18, at 143; see KANT, supra note 1, at 102. Query: may there be
priceless, incomparable, incommensurably worthy art?
28. SULLIVAN, supra note 24, at 200. Mere things are said to have only "extrinsic, con-
ditional, and subjective value." Id. at 195.
29. See id. at 203-08.
30. H. J. PATON, THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE: A STUDY IN KANT'S MORAL
PHILOSOPHY 165 (4th ed. 1963).
31. See id.
32. See, e.g., HILL, supra note 19, at 87.
33. See SULLIVAN, supra note 24, at 194.
34. See id. at 194, 200 ("[Olur positive duties to ourselves concern mainly our own
moral perfection... whereas our positive duties to others concern mainly their happi-
ness."); WOOD, supra note 18, at 142 ("[Tihis is how we should understand the worth of the
ends Kantian ethics holds to be obligatory: our own perfection and the happiness of oth-
ers.").
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our moral duty is not to paternalistically try to perfect their own
moral virtue." Rather, in light of their own dignity and moral
autonomy, one's moral duty toward others is primarily to help
promote their happiness in their own way, through sharing in
their own projects within the scope of the moral law and other
constraints.36
The moral law and other considerations sets limits on our duty
to assist others in their projects. Kant sensibly recognizes that
the duty of respect and benevolence that we morally owe others
cannot be determined by a precise universal rule, because context
and circumstance play important roles.37 The exercise of judg-
ment is necessary to decide particular cases.38
In such decisions, both "the extent of our resources and the se-
verity of the needs of others"39 should be primary considerations.
Kant, as a person of his own time and culture, suggests that the
duty of benevolence diminishes with distance," and that "differ-
ences in social rank, age, sex, health, economic situation, educa-
tion, and even personality traits may all be legitimately taken
into account."41 Of course, all persons, regardless of status, must
still be affirmatively respected as ends in themselves.42
As we think about the scope and limits of our duty of respect
and benevolence for others, it is important to bear in mind that
Kant is not thinking of what is especially morally admirable,
morally optional, or saintly. The Kantian formula of ends imposes
a genuine moral duty: "what is commanded... is that each moral
35. "[O]ur duty to ourselves is to seek as an end our own natural and moral perfection
but not our happiness; and that our duty to others is to seek as an end their happiness but
not their perfection." PATON, supra note 30, at 172.
36. See SULLIVAN, supra note 24, at 205, 207; WOOD, supra note 18, at 151.
37. See KANT, METAPHYSICS, supra note 5, at 156; WOOD, supra note 18, at 150.
38. See KANT, METAPHYSICS, supra note 5, at 156, 161; SULLIVAN, supra note 24, at
208.
39. SULLIVAN, supra note 24, at 208
40. See id. ("[W]e are obligated to show a greater benevolence to those closest to us.").
"Closest" may be defined by the circumstances to include "physical proximity, emotional
closeness," familial ties or cultural or ideological similarities. Id.
41. Id. Given the Kantian logic of human dignity, even if it is perversely thought ap-
propriate to first assist persons of high "social rank," it would be ultimately indefensible to
actively or passively stunt the development of the basic rational capacities latent within
persons who seek an education.
42. See id. at 203.
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agent strive to preserve and promote rational nature in all per-
sons... affected by his actions, not just in himself."'
The duty of promoting others' projects, or their happiness, is of
course an "imperfect" duty." It is possible for us, for example, not
to murder anyone, but no human holds the power to educate
every rational or potentially rational person. The first duty is in
this sense perfect, the second imperfect. Determining that a duty
is imperfect does not, however, reveal much about the scope or
depth of that duty, or convert it into something less than a duty.
Even an imperfect moral duty is more than a suggestion and can
be reasonably enforced through the law.
The positive duty of benevolence, according to Kant, arises
from our ultimately inescapable vulnerability and lack of self-
sufficiency as persons. As Onora O'Neill observes, "[almong vul-
nerable beings agency can be secure for all only when agents act
to support as well as to respect one another's agency."45 In some
cases, the line between respecting agency and supporting agency
will be hopelessly blurred. Given our vulnerability and inescap-
able mutual dependencies, we must to some degree adopt the
goals and priorities of others as our own if we are to fully recog-
nize their agency, or their potential agency. 6 The Kantian posi-
tive duty does not invite general paternalism. Positive assistance
and respect, in this sense, are more a matter of providing oppor-
tunities and actively removing obstacles to agentic development
and the morally permissible goals set by other persons.47
Our imperfect moral duty to promote others' happiness must,
in crucial respects, overlap and correspond to the basic duty to
treat persons as ends. We must not fall short in fulfilling these
duties, whether out of habit, indifference, failure of imagination,
or selfishness. Again, the limits on such duties are controversial
and not easily drawn. Even if we could pinpoint the proper scope
and limits of our moral duties, it would not correlate to the scope
and limits of our proper legal duties. And collectively, our indi-
43. PAUL GUYER, KANT ON FREEDOM, LAW, AND HAPPINESS 199 (2000).
44. See PATON, supra note 30, at 172 ("We transgress perfect duties by treating any
person merely as a means. We transgress imperfect duties by failing to treat a person as
an end, even though we do not actively treat him merely as a means."); SULLIVAN, supra
note 24, at 207 ('The positive obligation of benevolence is a wide and imperfect duty.").
45. O'NEILL, supra note 20, at 140.
46. See id.
47. See Hill, supra note 1, at 97.
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vidual legal duties likely would not immediately translate into a
clear understanding of the scope and limits of our collective duty
as members of a state through government action.
Yet individually, and as a society, mankind must address these
matters. In fulfilling their duty, people should begin with what
should count as a justifiable limitation on our moral duty to assist
others. It is clear that good faith judgment48 and sensitivity to cir-
cumstance will be required.49 Beyond this, at least where no spe-
cial relationships exist, as that of bodyguard and employer,
Kant's formula suggests that "we may refrain from helping only if
such action would place our own rational action in jeopardy." °
This seems to be a reasonably demanding guide, but we might
wonder whether only effects on the benefactor's rationality are
relevant since our lives have other important dimensions.5 Even
if one focuses on the benefactor's own rationality, and sets aside
all effects on third parties, we are still left with a range of
stronger and weaker interpretations of the Kantian assistance
requirement. Surely one is not bound to, in effect, sacrifice his
own life for the benefit of strangers.52 Are others supposed to, self-
defeatingly, sacrifice their own lives for us? Who would be left?
Professor Barbara Herman articulates a defensible interpreta-
tion: "the requirements of beneficence do not interfere with what
is necessary for one to continue to live a human life; they also do
not protect all that one may find necessary to live as one wants.""
This interpretation of the Kantian beneficence duty inescapably
requires a substantial degree of personal sacrifice. Presumably,
the degree of personal sacrifice is in some rough proportion to
mankind's resources and the genuinely fulfillable basic needs of
others, which bears on their happiness and rational development.
Kant's libertarian and anti-paternalist element again call upon
people not to force their version of the rational and the good down
48. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
49. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
50. HERMAN, supra note 15, at 67.
51. See Hill, supra note 1, at 98-99.
52. See HERMAN, supra note 15, at 67.
53. Id.; see also KANT, METAPHYSICS, supra note 5, at 202 ("[Hiow far should one ex-
pend one's own resources in practicing beneficence? Surely not to the extent that he him-
self would finally come to need the beneficence of others."). Kant's concern is not only for
this sort of loose contradictoriness, but for what he takes to be government injustice in
generating or expanding inequalities of wealth and resources. See id. at 202-03.
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the throats of others. People must generally promote the chosen
projects of others, whether they would have chosen such projects
themselves, at least as long as their projects "are not manifestly
foolish or incompatible with the moral law."54 Presumably, there
cannot be a general moral requirement that subverts or directly
promotes subversion of the moral law.5 A desire for a basic, effec-
tive, rationality-developing education, however, hardly counts as
an immoral or arbitrary project.
Ultimately, we are morally bound to assist others in realizing
or developing their projects because it is only in that way that we
"exhibit proper esteem for their worth as rational beings."56 In
particular, "we surely would dishonor rational nature if we did
not cherish its development in children or if we failed to strive for
its recovery in men and women who have temporarily lost it."57
The duty of benevolence is again bottomed in respect for persons
as ends in themselves.
The actual exercise and development of rational powers, unlike
their mere presence or utter absence, is clearly a matter of de-
gree. The moral duty of beneficence toward others must take into
account this capacity for development. Rational nature is not
properly honored by barely bringing it into existence or defending
it only from utter extinction within a person. In order to properly
cherish the power of rational choice in others, mankind must rec-
ognize that another person's choice is fully human only when that
choice is fully rational and reasonable," or at least made under
conditions permitting such a fully rational choice. Respect for ra-
54. PATON, supra note 30, at 173.
55. Robert Paul Wolff argues that, at this point, we are in the process of trying to
flesh out what the Kantian formula means with respect to our actions toward others. We
seem to need an independent way to determine whether someone else's project violates the
Kantian moral law, although we might have hoped that the Kantian formula alone would
allow us to do that. See WOLFF, supra note 2, at 176. One possible solution would be to use
the alternative Kantian formulas, including perhaps the "universal law" version of the
Categorical Imperative, to determine which projects of other persons violate the moral
law. No single version of Kant's alternative formulas needs to be established first-they
could be mutually supportive of one another. And the lesson of Kant is that mankind must
be keenly aware of the possibility that their local cultural habits and prejudices may come
disguised as violations of a supposed universal moral law.
56. WOOD, supra note 18, at 149.
57. Id. at 144.
58. See KORSGAARD, supra note 13, at 123.
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tionality aims to permit its development and flourishing when-
ever possible.59
In this regard, one might think of Kant's formula of ends as a
contribution toward a theory of need-fulfillment. Kant does not
concern himself with those needs that bear upon mere biological
persisting, nor does he concern himself with alleged needs that
reflect merely sophisticated and pervasive commercial marketing.
Instead, Kant concerns himself with those needs "that must be
met if he [a person] is to function (or continue to function) as a ra-
tional, end-setting agent." °
Kant's understanding of human needs, insofar as they bear on
the duty of beneficence, must certainly account for biological
needs.6 However, Kant extends his understanding of the scope of
needs to "education and culture, as well as for various conditions
essential for the development and exercise of our moral sensibil-
ity and conscience, and for the powers of reason, thought, and
judgment."62
This article further discusses the scope, strength, and limits of
moral and legal duties of assistance, at the level of individuals
and groups in Part IV. For the moment, this article will apply the
Kantian formula of ends, as a society, to the case of Thomas
Hardy's character of Jude Fawley,63 who supports himself
through stone masonry, but who aspires to his natural place
among the students of Christminster:
Only a wall divided him from those happy young contemporaries of
his with whom he shared a common mental life; men who had noth-
ing to do from morning till night but to read, mark, learn, and in-
wardly digest. Only a wall-but what a wall! ... He was a young
workman in a white blouse, and with stone-dust in the creases of his
clothes; and in passing him they did not even see him, or hear him,
rather saw through him as through a pane of glass at their familiars
beyond. 64
59. See infra Part IV.F.
60. HERMAN, supra note 15, at 67.
61. See RAWLS, supra note 12, at 174.
62. Id. at 174-75.
63. See generally THOMAS HARDY, JUDE THE OBSCURE (Cedric Watts ed., Broadview
Press Ltd. 1999) (1895).
64. Id. at 121.
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Socially constructed economic barriers to human rational ful-
fillment are generally incompatible with the imperfect duty to
aid, and with the fundamental formula of ends itself.
III. A BRIEF INTERLUDE: THE KANTiAN FORMULA, THE GOLDEN
RULE, AND CLASSIC UTILITARIANISM
Before refining and applying the Kantian formula in legal con-
texts, it is useful to contrast the Kantian formula with both the
familiar Golden Rule and the basic idea underlying classical utili-
tarianism. This clarifies the Kantian formula of ends and the le-
gal issue discussions to follow.
Kant refers to the negative formulation of the Golden Rule in a
footnote immediately following his discussion of the formula of
ends.65 He argues briefly for the superiority of his formula.66 He
notes that self-sufficient persons might prefer to be left without
assistance if that relieved them of any duty to assist others,67 and
that the Golden Rule might be relied on by justly convicted per-
sons who would prefer not to be criminally sentenced.68 He refers
to the Golden Rule principle as "trite"6 9 or, at best, derivative
from his own formulation.7 ° The Golden Rule is thought by Kant
to leave too large a role for anyone's mere natural and arbitrary
inclinations and personal advantages.7 '
Actually, indeterminacy in application affects both Kant's for-
mula and the Golden Rule, as discussed in Part IV. It is not clear
that the case of the self-sufficient person who declines both to
help and to be helped is especially embarrassing for the Golden
Rule. In some ways, the Golden Rule asks the self-sufficient per-
son how he or she would wish to be treated in circumstances like
those of the person who needs, and is asking for help.
As for the case of the convict who wishes to be set free and who
argues that the sentencing judge would wish to be freed, whether
innocent or guilty, the response is murkier. Assume that a guilty
65. See KANT, GROUNDWORK, supra note 1, at 38.
66. See id.
67. See id.
68. See id.; see also Hill, supra note 1, at 89.
69. KANT, GROUNDWORK, supra note 1, at 38.
70. See id.
71. See RAWLS, supra note 12, at 199.
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sentencing judge would not want to be sentenced. It remains true
that a sentencing judge who applies the Golden Rule may also
consider the wishes of other persons affected by the sentencing
decision, including the victim and perhaps society in general.
Depending on interpretation, there is a sense in which the
Golden Rule and Kant's formula of ends may closely parallel one
another. The practical meaning of Kant's formula must be deter-
mined before the question of their differences 2 and similarities
can be answered." In particular, the Kantian formula cannot be
deemed "broader in scope and more demanding"" than the
Golden Rule until the sorts of legal problems addressed in Part IV
are resolved."
Treating persons as ends in themselves may also yield results
that differ from whatever counting process takes place in classical
utilitarianism. There is certainly more than one way to interpret
Kant's formula,76 and in some interpretations, some broadly utili-
tarian elements may be present.77 But Kant's formula cannot be
reduced to an expression of classical utilitarianism. The Kantian
formula of ends cannot be bound by classical utilitarian calcula-
tion." As John Rawls has written, "by viewing people as subjects
of desires and inclinations and assigning value to their satisfac-
72. For a brief discussion, see Joan Williams, The Rhetoric of Property, 83 IOwA L.
REV. 277, 348 (1998).
73. See id.
74. Richard W. Wright, The Principles of Justice, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1859, 1867
(2000) (referring to the understanding of Kant himself); see also Nelson Lund, The Presi-
dent as Client and the Ethics of the President's Lawyers, 61 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 65,
68 (1998) (referring to the Kantian formula as "the most rigorous secular formulation");
Louis E. Wolcher, The Paradox of Remedies: The Case of International Human Rights
Law, 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 515, 559-61 (2000) (discussing Walter Benjamin's sug-
gestion that Kant's formula is too weak, in that one ought never use anyone in any re-
spect, even partially, as a means).
75. For a more radical challenge to the Kantian principle, consider the plea of Th~r~se
of Lisieux: "I do not want to be a saint by halves.... I fear only one thing-that I should
keep my own will." SAINT TH1tRkSE OF LISIEUX, THE STORY OF A SOUL 26 (John Beevers
trans. 1957) (1898).
76. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
77. See R.M. HARE, SORTING OUT ETHICS 147 (1997); Cummiskey, supra note 6, at
587, 599.
78. See, e.g., Hill, supra note 1, at 87-88 (describing Kant's formula as incompatible
with utilitarian manipulation of persons for the sake of the broader general welfare); see
also Steven Shiffrin, Liberalism, Radicalism, and Legal Scholarship, 30 UCLA L. REV.
1103, 1123-24 (1983).
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tion as such, (classical) utilitarianism is at odds with Kant's doc-
trine at a fundamental level."7 9
Nor is the Kantian formula subject to anything like classical
utilitarian calculation. 0 At some point, the dignity of an end in
itself and the process of mere calculation are incompatible. The
ultimate irreconcilability of utilitarian calculation and Kantian
dignity is well expressed by the anti-utilitarian Charles Dickens
in Hard Times:
So many hundred Hands in this Mill; so many hundred horse Steam
Power. It is known, to the force of a single pound weight, what the
engine will do; but not all the calculators of the National Debt can
tell me the capacity for good or evil, for love or hatred, for patriotism
or discontent, for the decomposition of virtue into vice, or the reverse,
at any single moment in the soul of one of these its quiet servants,
with the composed faces and the regulated actions. There is no mys-
tery in it; there is an unfathomable mystery in the meanest of them,
for ever.
s8
Let us turn, then, to the mystery of human dignity and the
status of being an end in oneself, as that status is respected or
disrespected in the legal sphere.
IV. KANT'S FORMULA OF ENDS AND THE LAW: SOME CRUCIAL
CASES
A. Criminal Deterrence Theories of Punishment and Treating
Persons as Ends in Themselves
Kant's formula of treating persons as ends in themselves, as
elaborated above, does not, by itself, imply some single theory of
criminal punishment. It is open to doubt whether Kant's work, as
79. RAWLS, supra note 12, at 198. Kant certainly does not, whatever we may think of
his particular judgments in this regard, place all desires on the same moral plane. See,
e.g., KANT, METAPHYSICS, supra note 5, at 180 ("On Stupefying Oneself by the Excessive
Use of Food or Drink"). The discussion need not be bound by any of Kant's own particular
judgments that do not follow from the most satisfactory interpretation of Kant's formula.
80. See KANT, METAPHYSICS, supra note 5, at 156 (indicating that the Kantian for-
mula is to operate at the level of maxim or principle, rather than as a precise determiner
among possible choices, and that some degree of contextual judgment and latitude is ines-
capable).
81. CHARLES DICKENS, HARD TIMES 56 (Fred Kaplan and Sylv6re Manod eds., W.W.
Norton & Company, Inc., 3d ed. 2001) (1854).
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a whole, presents a clear and unified theory.12 Our concern, how-
ever, is only with the implications Kant's formula of ends may
have for punishment.
Kant himself addresses the logic of criminal punishment in the
following way:
Punishment by a court... can never be inflicted merely as a means
to promote some other good for the criminal himself or for civil soci-
ety. It must always be inflicted upon him only because he has com-
mitted a crime. For a human being can never be treated merely as a
means to the purposes of another or be put among the objects of
rights to things; his innate personality protects him from this .... 83
Contemporary American courts authoritatively cite these sen-
timents.84 What Kant means, and what his remarks in this con-
text really amount to, however, are not entirely clear.
Deterrence theories of punishment, by way of contrast, empha-
size the operation of a criminal punishment as a threat or incen-
tive intended to influence future behavior.8 " Optimal deterrence
levels are those that, all costs accounted for, maximize social wel-
fare.86 Thus, at the very least, there is a difference in emphasis
between deterrence theories and Kant's formula of ends in the
sphere of punishment.
It is, however, difficult to detect any unbridgeable gulf between
Kant's formula and deterrence theories. Kant's formula of ends
does not rule out deterrence, or any other principle but retribu-
tion, as a vital, perhaps even primary, justification of punish-
82. See Jeffrie G. Murphy, Does Kant Have a Theory of Punishment?, 87 COLUM. L.
REV. 509, 509 (1987) (questioning Kant's theories on crime and punishment).
83. KANT, METAPHYSICS, supra note 5, at 105.
84. See, e.g., United States v. Blarek, 7 F. Supp. 2d 192, 200-01 (E.D.N.Y. 1998)
(Weinstein, J.); State v. Gardner, 947 P.2d 630, 634-35 (Utah 1997).
85. See, e.g., ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS 38
(reprint ed. 1986) ("[B]y 'general deterrence,' we mean the effect that a threat to punish
has, in inducing people to refrain from prohibited conduct."); Dan M. Kahan, The Secret
Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413, 415 (1999) ("[Bly 'deterrence' I intend to
refer broadly to the consequentialist theory, propounded by Bentham and refined by his
economist successors, that depicts punishment as a policy aimed at creating efficient be-
havioral incentives."). See generally Johs Andenaes, General Prevention-Illusion or Real-
ity, in THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT 138, 142 (Stanley E. Grupp ed. 1971); Gordon Hawkins,
Punishment and Deterrence: The Educative, Moralizing, and Habituative Effects, in
THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT, supra, at 163, 165, 172; Karl F. Schuessler, The Deterrent Ef-
fect of the Death Penalty, in THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT, supra, at 181, 182; Kyron Huigens,
The Dead End of Deterrence, and Beyond, 41 WM. & MARY L. REv. 943 (2000).
86. See, e.g., Kahan, supra note 85, at 425.
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ment.87 Certainly, Kant seems committed to limiting punishment
to cases of the actual commission of a crime, and thus, to oppose
preventive detention."8 But Kant repeats, here and elsewhere,
that his objection is not to treating convicted defendants as a
means; it is to treating such persons merely as a means, or as a
means and not at the same time as ends in themselves.8 9
Thus, the Kantian formula of ends by itself does not rule out a
criminal jurisprudence that is substantially deterrence-oriented.
But it is certainly possible to critique largely deterrence-oriented
criminal jurisprudence from the standpoint of the Kantian prin-
ciple. One interesting, if speculative, line to pursue would ask
whether an excessive reliance on deterrence theories may actu-
ally tend to undermine the effectiveness of deterrence systems
over time.
After all, deterrence is a matter of adjusting disincentives to
criminal acts.90 The disincentives actually needed to limit crimi-
nal acts to any given degree vary among cultures and over time.
A Kantian might argue that if we all think of criminal punish-
ments not so much as condemnations but as components of a
network of incentives, we may begin to think of crime less as a
matter of intrinsic wrong and more as an option with a socially
imposed "price" or cost in the form of the possible sentence. The
criminal code becomes, to a degree, something akin to a restau-
rant menu with specified prices for each item. We come to con-
sider the personal benefits of committing the offense; the realistic
risks of detection, apprehension, and prosecution; the costs of de-
fense and of the likely criminal sentence; and so on. But this sort
of cold-eyed calculation may, over time, tend to progressively
drive up the required price, if crime rates are to remain stable in
the face of this demoralized, calculative approach to law viola-
tion.9' Under this view, deterrence-oriented theories may become
self-destructively unstable in a way that a pure Kantian approach
87. But see Blarek, 7 F. Supp. 2d at 201 ("i[1t follows from this position that the sole
justification for criminal punishment is retribution or Jus talionis.).
88. See I. A. Duff, Penal Communications: Recent Work in the Philosophy of Punish-
ment, 20 CRIME & JUST. 1, 9-10 (1996).
89. See supra text accompanying note 83.
90. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
91. For general discussion of the possibility that initially effective elements of deter-
rence may erode over time, see Daniel S. Nagin, Criminal Deterrence Research at the Out-
set of the Twenty-First Century, 23 CRIME & JUST. 1, 4-5 (1998) (focusing on gradual
change in the perceived "stigma" of a criminal conviction).
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may not. Kant may appear to put proportional prices on crimes,
but he also wishes to condemn, and not just optimally price,
criminality.
In this sense it may be possible to show the Kantian formula of
ends having an advantage against deterrence theories of criminal
punishment. However, we cannot truly assess the merits of the
Kantian formula of ends in this context, as in others, until we
have further clarified what the formula really does and does not
require.
Most importantly, we must develop a better sense for what is
actually involved in treating persons, at least partially, or in
some respect, as ends in themselves. Consider the supposedly
clear92 case of preventive detention. This sort of case is thought to
involve a clear violation of the Kantian principle. Thus it has
been assumed that
if we... preemptively detain someone who has not yet broken the
law, our treatment of him does not depend on his choices or actions
as a responsible agent but solely on our belief that this will secure
some social benefit: we thus treat him "merely as a means" to that
social benefit.
93
It is certainly possible to imagine some systems of preventive
detention that bypass a person's rational capacities-more spe-
cifically the ability on rational or moral grounds to reflect upon
and reject a possible criminal action. For example, preventive de-
tention based entirely on some specific DNA configuration that is
assumed to dictate behavior might well fail to treat the detainee
as a person.
Preventive detention, as traditionally understood, need not
take that extreme form. Preventive detention might be based on a
person's deliberate decision to engage in particular forms of dan-
gerous, anti-social, aggressive, or socially irresponsible conduct,
regardless of whether such conduct is criminal. The precise con-
tours of the preventive detention policy could be announced long
in advance of any such choices by eventual detainees. Certainly,
it is possible that reasonable persons could consent to the imposi-
92. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
93. See Duff, supra note 88, at 10. For a further critique of excessive reliance on pre-
ventive detention under the guise of punishment, see generally Paul H. Robinson, Punish-
ing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive Detention as Criminal Justice, 114 HARV. L. REV.
1429 (2001).
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tion of such a preventive detention program, even as it might
eventually affect them personally. To fall within the detention
program, each person would, in light of their knowledge of the
program, have to then undertake whatever actions were the nec-
essary predicate to preventive detention.
All sorts of preventive detention programs can be imagined.
But it is far from clear that all standard forms of preventive de-
tention fail to treat detainees as ends in themselves. Preventive
detention may be imposed in light of presumably free and volun-
tary acts knowledgeably undertaken by the detainee. The preven-
tive detention program in such a case acknowledges and assumes
the eventual detainee's capacities to rationally and morally delib-
erate.
It is of course possible to criticize this kind of preventive deten-
tion program on moral grounds. But that hardly solves the Kant-
ian problem. If the preventive detention program described im-
mediately above does not respect detainees as ends in themselves,
how can Kantians say that traditional criminal jurisprudence, in-
volving trial and sentencing for a particular criminal offense,
does? Essentially the same respect or lack of respect for rational
humanity seems involved in both cases.
But the problem for some Kantians is broader than just the
context of preventive detention. Consider the deterrence approach
more generally. Kantians might say that a pure deterrence ap-
proach treats defendants as means to some social goal, such as
security of property, personal liberty, or the general well-being.94
A deterrence jurisprudence, however, need not treat persons
merely as means to any end. One should first note that Kant can
hardly consider social goals such as security, well-being, or liberty
to be arbitrary or mere subjective fancy." We can certainly imag-
ine rational persons consenting in advance to the pursuit of these
particular social goals, even at their own possible future ex-
pense.9" More basically, it is simply unclear that a deterrence ju-
94. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
95. Kant regards, for example, one's own happiness as something one inevitably
seeks, and he regards seeking the happiness of others as a duty of virtue. See KANT,
METAPHYSICS, supra note 5, at 150. The crucial, non-arbitrary status of these conditions is
a major theme of GUYER, supra note 43.
96. See, e.g., KANT, METAPHYSICS, supra note 5, at 108 (discussing the role of advance
legislative consent to possible later punishment). More broadly, see, e.g., IMMANU.EL KANT,
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risprudence must fail, at any point, in all respects to treat per-
sons as ends in themselves.
Deterrence, after all, may take more than one form. We might,
admittedly, deter undesirable behavior by some advanced techni-
cal means that completely bypasses any deliberation and choice.
But deterrence regimes need not work that way. Deterrence re-
gimes, given the analogy to menus with items and associated
prices,9 may treat persons as much as ends in themselves as a
non-profit restaurant.
A restaurant may simply offer a variety of items at associated
prices, to be freely selected or not, in accordance with the diner's
own deliberations and decisions. A deterrence regime may con-
sciously rely on persons to exercise their powers of deliberation
and choice with respect to possible criminal conduct. Whatever
social goals deterrence may promote, it need not ignore, bypass,
or subvert, and may consciously depend upon, the rational hu-
manity of its subjects."
All told, one could object to a deterrence theory of criminal pun-
ishment on any number of grounds. This article has recognized
the possibility of some preventive detention and deterrence sys-
tems that fail to treat persons as ends in themselves. A deter-
rence system that relied, for example, on making some persons
utterly incapable of choice would presumably fail to treat such
persons as ends. There is no reason to suppose, however, that ei-
ther preventive detention or a deterrence theory of punishment
must at some point violate the Kantian formula of ends.
CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON 74 (Mary Gregor trans., Cambridge Univ. Press ed. 1997)
(1788) [hereinafter KANT, CRITIQUE], where Kant links one's possible consent to the status
of being an end in oneself. According to Kant, "such a being is not to be subjected to any
purpose that is not possible in accordance with a law that could arise from the will of the
affected subject himself; hence this subject is to be used never merely as a means but as at
the same time an end." Id. Of course, we can consent to many things we would not consis-
tently will to be universal laws.
97. See supra text at notes 85-86.
98. See United States v. Bergman, 416 F. Supp. 496, 499 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) ("[W]e take
the widely accepted stance that a criminal punished in the interest of general deterrence
is not being employed 'merely as a means. .. ").
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B. Commercial Appropriation of Image or Likeness
Often, a commercial enterprise hopes to profit by seizing upon
some aspect of an attractive or popular person's appearance or
persona. Without the person's consent, the commercial enterprise
seeks to exploit an element of his or her appearance for commer-
cial gain. The unconsented appropriation of image need not be
embarrassing or disruptive of the exploited subject's life. In such
cases, however, there is often an unconscious reduction of a per-
son to one or more of her component parts. The person herself is
treated as a mere locus of such component parts, and the market-
able parts are involuntarily appropriated, at least in the sense of
being commercially reproduced, for the financial gain of the com-
mercial enterprise.
Such activities are often recognized as tortious,99 despite the
law's slow and insensitive start in this matter. 100 The law ad-
dressing such nonconsensual image appropriation seems, at first,
to give legal effect to the Kantian formula of ends. One author
has argued that "[t]he commodification and nonconsensual com-
mercial exploitation of another's name or photograph appears to
violate this basic Kantian prescription, and thus the subject's
personal dignity."'0 '
Does the tort of nonconsensual appropriation of image for profit
exhaust the relevant concerns underlying the Kantian formula of
ends? Does, for example, any Kantian indignity in the reduction
99. See, e.g., Martin Luther King, Jr. Ctr. for Soc. Change v. Am. Heritage Prods. Inc.,
296 S.E.2d 697 (Ga. 1982); Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905);
Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, 582 N.W.2d 231, 234 (Minn. 1998) (recognizing that "the vast
majority of jurisdictions now recognize some form of the right to privacy"); Brinkley v. Ca-
sablancas, 438 N.Y.S.2d 1004 (N.Y. 1981) (recognizing a statutory privacy right in New
York).
100. Consider the well-known "Flour of the Family" case of Roberson v. Rochester Fold-
ing Box Co., 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902). In Roberson, the unauthorized publication of photo-
graphs of a young woman for commercial gain could not be enjoined, even if the woman in
question suffered ridicule and great mental and physical distress, where the image util-
ized was not libelous although readily recognizable. See id. at 442-43.
101. Scott Shorr, Note, Personal Information Contracts: How to Protect Privacy Without
Violating the First Amendment, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1756, 1771 n.59 (1995). See generally
Edward J. Eberle, Practical Reason" The Commercial Speech Paradigm, 42 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 411, 467 (1992) (discussing Kant's opposition to the use of persons merely as a
means inspires arguments in favor of limiting some commercial speech); Steven Shiffrin,
The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away From a General Theory of the First
Amendment, 78 Nw. U. L. REV. 1212, 1280 (1983) (discussing Kant on persons as objects of
commercial manipulation).
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of a person to his or her most sexually appealing features disap-
pear if the model gives his or her consent and is paid? Obtaining
the model's consent may bring the transaction squarely into the
realm of market exchange. And there are, undoubtedly, some
elements, or proto-elements, of Kantian dignity in a free and vol-
untary market exchange. For example, free and voluntary market
exchange typically involves "treating all buyers and sellers on the
market impersonally and honestly."10 2
This article will later address the question of whether properly
functioning markets can be taken as an institutional embodiment
of Kantian respect for persons as ends. 3 In the meantime, hang-
ing the moral quality of commercial appropriation of personal ap-
pearance on whether consent has been given seems more Lockean
than Kantian. It is, after all, John Locke who more strongly em-
phasizes that "every Man has a Property in his own Person."104
Kant, in contrast, emphasizes the dignitary character not only
of what people do to us without our consent, but what we do to or
choose for ourselves as well. Consider, for example, this variation
of Kant's formula:
Now I say that the human being, and in general every rational being,
exists as an end in itself, not merely as a means to be used by this or
that will at its discretion; instead, he must in all his actions, whether
directed to himself or also to other rational beings, always be re-
garded at the same time as an end.
10 5
For Kant, the formula of ends may be violated by particular ac-
tions directed toward oneself, or the acts of others bearing upon
one's dignity to which one may well have consented. Therefore,
one cannot, given one's status as an end, consent to one's own
102. BERNARD BARBER, ABSOLUTIZATION OF THE MARKET: SOME NOTES ON How WE
GOT THERE FROM HERE, iN MARKETS AND MORALS 15, 26 (Gerald Dworkin et al. eds.,
1977).
103. See infra Parts IV.C, F.
104. JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT § 27, at 328 (Peter Laslett ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1970) (1690); cf. Stephen M. Lobbin, The Rights of Publicity in
California: Is Three Really Greater than One?, 2 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 157, 159 (1995) (dis-
cussing the right of publicity as requiring compensation for the appropriation of one's per-
sona); Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity
Rights, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 127, 130 (1993) (discussing the commercial value of a celebrity's
identifring characteristics as his or her property).
105. KANT, GROUNDWORK, supra note 1, at 95 (emphasis added).
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murder for the sake of pain relief, as an act of retaliation, or
merely for a favorable insurance settlement. 10 6
Thus, if there is something inconsistent with one's status as an
end in being reduced to merely one's most popular or most mar-
ketable anatomical features, or to one's mere appearance, even
voluntary, compensated consent to this appropriation may not
save the buyer or seller from a violation of the formula of ends.
One may well argue that not all such commercial reductions,
compensated or not, really amount to grievous moral or legal of-
fenses. This is a fair and important point. Perhaps one way to
draw a distinction would be to say that commercial advertising of
some constituent part of a person may tend to reduce the person
to that constituent part. This process of reduction, however, does
seem to come in degrees.
When a woman is reduced to her mere personal appearance,
the consequences may be harmful for her, cumulatively for other
women, and ultimately for all persons. 7 Not all cases of commer-
cial appropriation seem to involve significant reductionism. If
they do, then not all reductionism really amounts to what we
might call dehumanization. If one calls all commercial exploita-
tion dehumanizing, then dehumanization itself seems to come in
degrees. In today's commercial market, some cases of reduction-
ism are not to be taken entirely straight, but as ironic, distanced,
or unserious.
In any event, it seems clear that both reductionism and dehu-
manization in themselves, as well as any resulting harms, can
vary significantly in degree. Consider first a basketball shoe ad-
vertising campaign that attempts to reduce a reasonably interest-
ing, rational decision-making basketball star to merely a person
with extraordinary leaping ability. Suppose even that such com-
mercial campaigns actually have some tendency to discourage, or
to undermine the credibility of, the athlete who later meaning-
fully addresses any social issue.
106. See id. at 96-97 (giving examples of particular reasons to commit suicide). This is
not to suggest that Locke would put no restraints on what we may do with our own bodies
if those actions do not directly affect others. See LOCKE, supra note 104, § 6, at 288-89.
107. For example, one might think of a receptionist who is hired and retained not so
much on a range of office skills, but largely on the basis of mere appearance.
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Still, this plainly cannot be as intrinsically bad, or as bad in its
further consequences, as some other forms of failure to treat per-
sons as ends in themselves. Consider, as a clear example, a mili-
tary commander who orders the deliberate bombing of purely ci-
vilian non-combatant areas in the hopes that such slaughter of
innocent persons will tend to demoralize his military oppo-
nents. 0 8 Here, the bombing victims need not be treated at all as
ends in themselves. Their exclusive use value lies in the antici-
pated ability of their deaths, which required no expression of
their rational humanity on their part, to affect others. The bomb-
ing victims are treated simply as means.
The contrasting examples, along with the range of their inher-
ent and consequential seriousness, tell us that the Kantian for-
mula of ends does not mark off only serious moral error, let alone
the most serious error.' 9 A clear violation of the Kantian formula
of ends need not be a serious moral, let alone legal, violation. Af-
ter all, it is probably a violation of the formula of ends if we inten-
tionally walk directly behind someone whose sheer physical size
has the effect of sheltering us from an unpleasantly cold wind.
Doubtless, one recognizes in such a case that our human wind-
screen is choosing where to walk through his own exercise of ra-
tional capacities, but this seems irrelevant. One could just as eas-
ily instead be following some sort of large machine or vehicle
down the sidewalk.
Yet this clear violation of the Kantian formula of ends could
hardly be classed as morally or legally serious. Ultimately, we
will need to develop, generally or in a specific context, something
that is unfortunately left underdeveloped in Kant: a satisfactory
theory of which violations of the Kantian formula are morally and
legally worse than others, and why this is so. The discussion of
the legal status of welfare and education below will briefly touch
again upon these matters."0
108. For discussion of some relevant international law principles in a moral context,
see generally R. George Wright, Noncombatant Immunity: A Case Study in the Relation-
ship Between International Law and Morality, 67 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 335 (1992).
109. In this, the formula of ends turns out to be like the Golden Rule, or an injunction
to maximize utility. See supra Part III.
110. See infra Part IV.F.
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C. Workplace Sexual Harassment and the Kantian Formula:
Respect, Opportunity, and Equality
Workplace sexual harassment, in its many and varied forms, is
a particularly useful context to test the best understanding of the
formula of ends. Again, our focus will not be on determining how
Kant himself, more than two hundred years ago, would have sub-
jectively reacted to women in various sorts of workplaces tradi-
tionally reserved for men."' Instead, our focus is on the best pos-
sible interpretation of, and the most useful understanding of, the
formula of ends in this context.
This is not to say that Kant's work is devoid of material that
might bear specifically on some cases of workplace harassment.
Consider, for example, that Kant essentially repeats the formula
of ends toward the close of The Metaphysics of Morals:
Every human being has a legitimate claim to respect from his fellow
human beings and is in turn bound to respect every other. Humanity
itself is a dignity; for a human being cannot be used merely as a
means by any human being (either by others or even by himself) but
must always be used at the same time as an end. It is just in this
that his dignity (personality) consists .... Hence there rests on him
a duty regarding the respect that must be shown to every other hu-
man being."
2
Kant, of course, does not mean to suggest that the idea of re-
spect bears only one sense, and that this is the sense.13 But con-
sider the applicability of Kant's remarks, closely following the
above restatement of his formula, in which Kant concludes that
holding up to ridicule a person's... supposed faults as if they were
real, in order to deprive him of the respect he deserves, and the pro-
pensity to do this, a mania for caustic mockery.., has something of
fiendish joy in it; and this makes it an even more serious violation of
one's duty of respect for other human beings."
4
111. We need not endorse any particular attitudes that Kant, a son of the Enlighten-
ment, may have held toward women.
112. KANT, METAPHYSICS, supra note 5, at 209 (emphasis omitted).
113. See id. at 213. See generally Stephen L. Darwall, Two Kinds of Respect, 88 ETHICS
36 (1977) (distinguishing "recognition respect," the kind most relevant in our context, from
the more variable "appraisal respect"). For example, this distinction is roughly akin to the
varying degrees of respect earned by tennis players through their prowess or longevity. Id.
at 41-42.
114. KANT, METAPYSICS, supra note 5, at 213 (emphasis omitted). For reference to the
phenomenon of "fiendish" joy in some instances of sexual harassment, see e. christi cun-
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There are of course many sorts of sexual harassment, moti-
vated and subjectively experienced by their targets in varied
ways. Kant's denunciation of caustic ridicule as a violation of the
duty of respect certainly cannot cover the range of different sorts
of sexual harassment. On the other hand, this denunciation of
caustic ridicule reveals that specific Kantian language can be
brought to bear on some important dimensions of workplace har-
assment."'
Some forms of workplace sexual harassment can easily be seen
as violative of Kant's formula. Other forms of harassment seem,
literally, to comply with at least a minimalist understanding of
what the Kantian formula requires. Only when the Kantian for-
mula is taken with proper seriousness can all common forms of
sexual harassment be clearly seen as violating that formula. Only
then can the full and appropriate structural remedy for work-
place harassment come into view.
It is easy to see the relevance of the Kantian formula when the
harassment is described in terms of the objectification of the tar-
get," 6 of degradation," 7 or of the relationship between predator
and prey."' This sort of terminology obviously lends itself to
analysis in Kantian terms.
ningham, Preserving Normal Heterosexual Male Fantasy: The "Severe or Pervasive"
Missed-Interpretation of Sexual Harassment in the Absence of Tangible Job Consequence,
1999 U. CH. LEGAL F. 199, 199.
115. For example, some actionable cases refer to "ridicule and insult that is sufficiently
severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abu-
sive working environment." Shira A. Scheindlin & John Elofson, Judges, Juries, and Sex-
ual Harassment, 17 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 813, 813 (1999) (emphasis added) (citing Harris
v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)).
116. See, e.g., Heyne v. Caruso, 69 F.3d 1475, 1480 (9th Cir. 1995) (identifying sexual
harassment of others as relevant and probative of the defendant's general disrespect for
and sexual objectification of his female employees); Kerri Lynn Bauchner, From Pig in a
Parlor to Boar in a Boardroom: Why Ellerth Isn't Working and How Other Ideological
Models Can Help Reconceptualize the Law of Sexual Harassment, 8 COLUM. J. GENDER &
L. 303, 303 (1999) (making reference to a victim's actual subjective feelings of objectifica-
tion and degradation); see also Bauchner, supra, at 307-08 (analyzing encroachment upon
a victim's "sense of sanctity" and describing sexual harassment as 'demeaning and 'in-
compatible with dignity and well-being of all the women in that workplace'") (quoting Lei-
bovitz v. New York City Transit Authority, 4 F. Supp. 2d 144, 152 (E.D.N.Y. 1998)).
117. See, e.g., Bauchner, supra note 116, at 303.
118. See Janet Sigal & Heidi Jacobsen, A Cross-Cultural Exploration of Factors Affect-
ing Reactions to Sexual Harassment Attitudes and Policies, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POLY & L.
760, 770 (1999).
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It is less obvious that all standard forms of workplace sexual
harassment violate the Kantian formula. This is true of at least
some instances of both quid pro quo and hostile environment sex-
ual harassment."9 We can, for example, imagine a case of quid
pro quo sexual harassment in which the harasser fully credits the
target's ability to perform all sorts of subtle rational calculations
regarding the harasser's true intent, the harasser's true organiza-
tional status and power, the likelihood of a bluff, the victim's ac-
tual degree of vulnerability, the chances of institutional or legal
redress, and the effects of compliance or resistance on the likeli-
hood of future threats. 2 ° In a sense, granting, and even relying
on, the target's ability, even under emotional circumstances, 2'
recognizes the target as a rationally deliberative end in herself.
A harasser might implicitly envision his victim as capable of
rationality and moral law making, and thus not a mere thing.'22
For some harassers, there may be no real motive for the harass-
ment, and less reason' either for overt anger or for humiliating
fun, if the target were indeed merely an object or thing. 4
In the end, the Kantian formula, when suitably interpreted,
can handle not only both the most overtly degrading, rationality-
bypassing sorts of sexual harassment 2 and pervasive ridicule,'26
119. See, e.g., Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 752 (1998); Meritor Sav.
Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986).
120. See, e.g., Steven H. Aden, "Harm in Asking." A Reply to Eugene Scalia and an
Analysis of the Paradigm Shift in the Supreme Court's Title VII Sexual Harassment Juris-
prudence, 8 TEMP. POL. & CrV. RTS. L. REV. 477, 498-99 (1999); Barbara A. Gutek, et al.,
The Utility of the Reasonable Woman Legal Standard in Hostile Environment Sexual Har-
assment Cases: A Multimethod, Multistudy Examination, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POLY & L. 596,
602 (1999) ("[Wjomen who are victims of mild forms of sexual harassment may under-
standably worry whether a harasser's conduct is merely a prelude to violent sexual as-
sault.").
121. See, e.g., Anita Bernstein, An Old Jurisprudence: Respect in Retrospect, 83
CORNELL L. REv. 1231, 1236 (1998) [hereinafter Bernstein, An Old Jurisprudence]; Anita
Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment With Respect, 111 HARV. L. REV. 445, 461 (1997)
[hereinafter Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment].
122. See, e.g., KANT, GROUNDWORK, supra note 1, at 102 (discussing the importance of
moral thinking for the status of being an end in oneself).
123. See id. at 95 (referring to "arbitrary use" of another).
124. This seems potentially true even with some cases of hostile environment sexual
harassment, the more difficult kind of case in this respect. Something might be added to a
hostile work environment in part for the fiendish entertainment of provoking the target to
reflect on the situation and her options, and to then make some sort of rational response.
125. Some forms of workplace harassment, for example, may take the form of a sexual
battery in which the perpetrator is indifferent to the state of mind of the victim, and
where the sexual battery might occur even if the victim were, for some reason, temporarily
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but also all sorts of sexual harassment. It can do so in a way that
recognizes the social systemic dimension and structural elements
of workplace harassment and discrimination. 1 7
Some forms of sexual harassment doubtless reflect unarticu-
lated fears, whether of competition or of the upset of one's world
view. Kant insightfully observes that someone can be the object of
fear, yet not the object of respect. 128 In fact, a leading scholar in
the field of sexual harassment law, Professor Anita Bernstein,
proposes to change the legal standard in sexual harassment cases
from that of a reasonable person, a reasonable woman, or a rea-
sonable victim, to what should be required of a "respectful per-
son."
129
Professor Bernstein relies explicitly on basic Kantian concepts,
including the linkages among the capacity for reason and intrin-
sic value and the respect-worthiness of all persons.3 ° Professor
Bernstein then argues that
a fundamental meaning of respect, apart from a separate meaning of
esteem, is recognition of a person's inherent worth. Respect in the
sense of recognition is owed to all persons, and thus workplace sex-
ual harassment betrays the ideal of recognition respect, regardless of
whether the harassed worker deserves high esteem.
131
It is certainly fair to think of Kantian, or recognition, respect
as an ideal, even though the crucial aim of sexual harassment law
is to arrive at legally enforceable standards. Straightforwardly,
"recognition" or Kantian formula of ends respect must, in a sense,
remain an ideal until it is universally accorded. A society without
incapable of recognizing or reacting to the battery in question.
126. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
127. See, e.g., Wendy Pollack, Sexual Harassment: Women's Experience vs. Legal Defi-
nitions, 13 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 35, 39-41 (1990) (describing sexual harassment as a sys-
temic problem rather than "the isolated problem of a lone victim" and rejecting the liberal
legal value of autonomy, but only on the assumption that analysis in terms of autonomy
must be individualizing, and thus blind to the systematic or social nature of subordina-
tion).
128. See KANT, CRITIQUE, supra note 96, at 66.
129. See supra note 121.
130. See Anita Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment, supra note 121, at 484. Profes-
sor Bernstein also notes that "human beings, according to Kant, possess intrinsic value
and are entitled to respect." Id. at 483.
131. Id. at 452 (emphasis omitted). For a distinction between "recognition respect" and
"appraisal respect," see Darwall, supra note 113.
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murder is in this sense also an ideal, but that does not prevent us
from making murder a legal, and not just a moral, wrong.
Less straightforward, the moral imperative of Kantian respect
for persons is violated even in a case in which the target does not
object to the harassment, perhaps because she has been per-
suaded that it is normal, or "nothing personal." In such a case, a
complaint may never be filed, and thus no legal case arises. Un-
der current hostile environment harassment law, the target in
such a case would, rightly or wrongly, have to show that she per-
ceived the environment as hostile or abusive at the time.
13 2
The basic Kantian approach can accommodate this failure of
the law to provide a remedy in such cases, given the clear viola-
tion of a universal moral duty. Kant broadly distinguishes be-
tween ethical duties or duties of virtue on the one hand, and du-
ties of right on the other; the former are not always legally
enforceable. 3 However, there is no deep Kantian reason why the
Kantian duty of respect should not be legally enforced even in
cases in which the target did not, for some reason, perceive her
situation to be one of harassment.
More disturbing is the possibility that Kant's formula of ends
so thoroughly reflects Enlightenment individualism that an ap-
proach to sexual harassment based on the dignity of the person
must misunderstand the social systemic 34 dimensions of sexual
harassment--dimensions of structural subordination,'35 group
inequalities,3 6 broad denial of a range of opportunities,' 37 and so
on.
132. See Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment, supra note 121, at 452.
133. See, e.g., KANT, METAPHYSicS, supra note 5, at 156-57.
134. See Bernstein, An Old Jurisprudence, supra note 121, at 1233 (discussing Kathryn
Abrams, The New Jurisprudence of Sexual Harassment, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1169, 1187
(1998)).
135. See id.
136. Abrams, supra note 134, at 1187; Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment, supra
note 121, at 485; Scheindlin & Elofson, supra note 115, at 813.
137. See Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment, supra note 121, at 495; Julianne
Scot, Pragmatism, Feminist Theory, and the Reconceptualization of Sexual Harassment,
10 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 203, 213 (1999). Probably the most thorough treatment of the
range of such lost opportunities, and their potentially prejudicial effects on the target's
workplace competence, is an article by Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harass-
ment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683 (1998). See also Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S.
629, 631 (1991) (requiring a showing that the harassment effectively "denied equal access
to an institution's opportunities and resources" in a Title IX sexual harassment case).
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For all of Kant's individualism, however, he can also be well-
attuned to the social and systemic dimensions of morally impor-
tant issues. For example, consider the key issue of wealth and
poverty itself. Kant does not focus on differential individual exer-
tion, or even on individual differences in luck or talent. Instead,
he interestingly writes that
[hiaving the resources to practice such beneficence as depends on the
goods of fortune is, for the most part, a result of certain human be-
ings being favored through the injustice of the government, which
introduces an inequality of wealth that makes others need their be-
neficence.
138
Thus, Kant is well aware of the possibility of systematic economic
inequalities of opportunity in general.13 9
A Kantian faithful to the respect owed to all persons as ends in
themselves can offer an explanation of, and a moral and legal re-
sponse to, the problem of sexual harassment that goes far beyond
seeing individual victims and individual perpetrators in isola-
tion. 4 ° A faithful Kantian will instead see sexual harassment as,
among other things, tending to inhibit the otherwise possible de-
velopment of the target's capacities for rational deliberation 4 '
and choice on the job. Sexual harassment also fails to minimally
cooperate with the victim's morally permissible projects,' chosen
138. KANT, METAPHYSICS, supra note 5, at 203. By way of contrast, consider John
Locke's belief that "as different degrees of Industry were apt to give Men Possessions in
different Proportions, so this Invention of Money gave them the opportunity to continue to
enlarge them." LOCKE, supra note 104, § 48, at 343.
139. It is unnecessary to assume that Kant's concern for human dignity must be unre-
lated to any concern for the effects of inequalities in status. A recent article, for example,
assumes that "Kantians might want to argue that the obvious source of the injury from
sexual harassment is the affront to the dignity of women that such harassment implies,
and this is unrelated to their rank in any status hierarchy." Gertrud M. Fremling & Rich-
ard A. Posner, Status Signaling and the Law, with Particular Application to Sexual Har-
assment, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1069, 1084 (1999).
Presumably, one's subordinate status in some hierarchy facilitates just the sort of
insult and ridicule Kant condemns as contrary to the worth of persons. See supra note 114.
The status difference adds depth, seriousness, credibility, and further complexity to the
narrower indignity itself
140. See supra notes 134-39 and accompanying text.
141. Kant sees everyone as having a moral duty to cultivate and develop their own ra-
tional capacities, but not generally to direct that cultivation in others. This would be self-
defeating paternalism. See KANT, METAPHYSICS, supra note 5, at 150-51. However, we
certainly have an affirmative duty to provide the basic material prerequisites of rational
development in others, and to promote the happiness of others while not impairing their
opportunities for rational development. See id. at 101, 150-51.
142. See id. at 151.
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by her" in her own way." For this analysis, we have quite rea-
sonably assumed that despite the resentment and hostility some-
times addressed to women occupying traditionally male job posi-
tions, the women incumbents of such non-traditional jobs are not
in fact violating any genuine, objective moral rule." If addressing
these wrongs requires legal reform of a systemic sort, then that is
what is called for. This article will further pursue the idea of sys-
temic law reform in Kant below.1
46
D. Human Cloning and the Surprising Reinforcement of Human
Dignity
Human cloning may or may not eventually become routine.
Whether it does is actually irrelevant to the forthcoming argu-
ment. For now, the serious moral issues raised by human cloning
remain largely hypothetical. However, there is some possibility
that those moral issues related to cloning will eventually become
real, and if so, corresponding issues of legal regulation will arise.
Kant's formula of ends cannot by itself satisfactorily address all
of the possible variations among cloning scenarios. Some imagin-
able forms of abusive cloning can indeed be convincingly critiqued
from the standpoint of the formula of ends, but others less di-
rectly so. As this article will discuss, some forms of human clon-
ing exemplify and reinforce several basic Kantian presuppositions
underlying the formula of ends.
143. See id.
144. In the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant essentially repeats the formula of ends
in arguing that a rational, autonomous person "is not to be subjected to any purpose that
is not possible in accordance with a law that could arise from the will of the affected sub-
ject himself...." KANT, CRITIQUE, supra note 96, at 74. Consider how this fundamental
Kantian requirement would play out in typical cases of sexual harassment. Should we
suppose that even in the least threatening cases of quid pro quo sexual harassment, the
victim could reasonably and consistently want to be subjected to non-consensual sexual
harassment as part of a relevant universalization of such practices of sexual harassment
for all times and places? Could any victim of sexual harassment rationally and consis-
tently will that fate not only for herself, but for every other relevantly situated person? At
the very least, quid pro quo sexual harassment, if universalized, founders on the scarcity
of possible job promotions. Universal sexual harassment, if that is itself even possible,
could not be compensated for by universal job promotion. The logic of any victim's willing
hostile environment sexual harassment for herself and for every other similarly situated
person at all times and places is even more obscure.
145. See KANT, METAPHYSICS, supra note 5, at 151.
146. See infra Part IV.F.
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There are some cloning scenarios that the Kantian formula can
obviously handle well. These cases include, for example, those in
which a clone with all of the rational and other capacities neces-
sary for free, deliberate, responsible, autonomous moral and other
choice is nonetheless treated merely as a means to some arbi-
trary, subjective end. In other words, a clone who is capable of
free and rational choice must be allowed to exercise such choice
on appropriate occasions. The philosopher of science Philip
Kitcher argues that
if cloning a human being is undertaken in the hope of generating
a... person whose standards of what matters in life are imposed
from without, then it is morally repugnant, not because it involves
biological tinkering, but because it is continuous with other ways of
interfering with human autonomy that we ought to resist.
1 47
This sort of dramatic interference with the goal-setting and other
reasoning processes of the clone plainly violates the Kantian re-
quirement that persons be treated as ends in themselves.'18
As for some other human clones, including some "hybridized"
and genetically enhanced or "designer" human clones, there is no
reason to believe that they will lack the capacities for rational
moral and other choice that is fundamental to Kantian status as
an end in oneself-assuming there are no disastrous mishaps in
the cloning process itself.
Early on in the collective experience with human cloning, some
custodial parents of physiologically normal clones may attempt,
in various ways, to deny the autonomy and Kantian dignity of the
clone offspring. Some may expect the clone of a great athlete to be
similarly accomplished, the clone of a fashion model to be beauti-
ful, and the clone of a distinguished scientist to reach similar
heights of achievement. Inevitably it will be proven, however,
that neither environment nor genetics is solely responsible for
one's acquired traits.' Eventually, custodial parents will learn
147. PHILIP KITCHER, THE LIVES TO COME: THE GENETIC REvOLUTION AND HUMAN
POSSIBILITIES 335 (1996).
148. See KANT, METAPHYSICS, supra note 1, at 96; see also Michael H. Shapiro, I Want
a Girl (Boy) Just Like the Girl (Boy) that Married Dear Old Dad (Mom): Cloning Lives, 9 S.
CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1, 139 (1999) (discussing how someone seen as merely a collection of
traits, and in this way objectified, may be being treated as a mere means, rather than as
an end).
149. It is apparently possible, for example, that a clone resulting from a father's nu-
clear cell material and a mother's mitochondrial genetic material outside the donor nu-
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that a clone is not a perfect genetic duplicate of the donor nu-
cleus, that the clone had a distinctive in utero and post-natal en-
vironment, 50 and that the flourishing and appreciation of talent
is largely a matter of historical and cultural context,'5 ' modified
by sheer luck.15 2
Thus, cloning one's self, a relative, a genetically healthier or
relatively more attractive person is unlikely, over the long term,
to seriously jeopardize the autonomy of the resulting clones. 53
One could argue that the mere existence of the clone is an affront
to human dignity; however, this is hardly self-evident. Are identi-
cal twins somehow an affront to human dignity? Quadruplets?
Two clones?
Identical twins are, of course, generally not intended or artifi-
cially produced. One might object to the cloning process itself;
this is different from showing that the genetically human result
of the cloning process is not an end in his or her self, or lacks
Kantian dignity. Consider a thought experiment in which one
grows up with a girl who seems in every respect to be entirely
normal, but after, say, forty years of experience, it is discovered
that the girl is actually the clone of someone across the globe. Is
there grounds to say that she only appeared to be an autonomous
end in herself, but that it is now apparent that she is not and
never actually was? Does it matter whether the clones know of
each other?
cleus may to some extent be affected by the mitochondrial genetic material. See David Or-
entlicher, Cloning and the Preservation of Family Integrity, 59 LA. L. REV. 1019, 1019 n.1
(1999); Michael H. Shapiro, The Impact of Genetic Enhancement on Equality, 34 WAKE
FOREST L. REv. 561, 567 n.19 (1999) ("The genome only provides the blueprint for forma-
tion of the brain; the finer details of assembly and intellectual development are beyond
direct genetic control and must perforce be subject to innumerable stochastic and envi-
ronmental influences.") (quoting Jon W. Gordon, Genetic Enhancement in Humans, 283
Sci 2023-24 (1999)).
150. See Shapiro, supra note 149, at 567 n.19.
151. Having the genetic foundation of a singing voice like that of Rudy Vallee, Bing
Crosby, or David Lee Roth is of little economic value if the clone's surrounding popular
culture is unresponsive to those vocal qualities, even merely as a matter of fashion.
152. Being a clone of Michael Jordan can hardly guarantee against an early, career-
ending injury to, say, one's Achilles' heel.
153. Of course, if the practice of cloning athletic or attractive persons becomes wide-
spread, one would expect the laws of supply and demand to assert themselves, resulting in
a diminished payoff for the now more abundant traits in question.
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Of course, cloning scenarios that range from the irresponsible
to the freakish or even horrifying can be envisioned.1 4 One can
imagine clones, whether deliberately mentally stunted or not, in-
tended merely to serve as predesignated spare bodily organ bags
for transplantation piecemeal into ill, but more desired, sib-
lings.'55 Such a practice reduces the produced clone to merely an
organ bank-a means to enhance the health or longevity of an-
other person, with or without the clone's consent. This treatment
generally violates the Kantian formula of ends.
One can conceive of large numbers'56 of clones, whether similar
in appearance or not, deliberately bred as a stunted, perpetually
docile, but somehow a useful, laboring,' 7 or slave laboring,
class. 158 Perhaps to add to the limited market demand for such
afamilial creatures, their genes could be altered not only for docil-
ity, but for marketable qualities such as increased tolerance of
pain, radiation, or some forms of pollution. 9
At this point, one must be careful in providing a Kantian ac-
count. It has been assumed that the clones referred to immedi-
ately above were, to some unspecified degree, designed to be men-
tally stunted, perhaps from a stage very near the beginning of
their existence. If such clones genuinely never had the potential
to become persons, in the sense of being capable of rational
autonomy, of free and deliberate reasoning, of recognizing the
moral law, and of choosing in accordance with reason and moral-
154. The popular imagination is touched by the fictional neo-Nazi plot developed in IRA
LEVIN, THE Boys FROM BRAzIL (reprint ed., 1995). Less dramatically, we can at least
imagine a clone designed to bear a corporate logo as a prominent birthmark, or a clone de-
signed to be unsteady on her feet, and thus subject to frequent falls for the sake of enter-
tainment or wagering.
155. For a range of responses, see, e.g., Michael Tooley, The Moral Status of the Clon-
ing of Humans, in HUMAN CLONING 65, 65-77 (James M. Humber & Robert F. Almeder
eds., 1998); Lori B. Andrews, Is There a Right to Clone?: Constitutional Challenges to Bans
on Human Cloning, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 643, 657 (1998); Michael A. Goldman, Human
Cloning: Science Fact and Fiction, 8 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 103, 115 (1998).
156. See David M. Buyers, An Absence of Love, in HUMAN CLONING: RELIGIOUS
REsPONSES 66, 75 (Ronald Cole-Turner ed., 1997).
157. See John A. Robertson, Liberty, Identity, and Human Cloning, 76 TEX. L. REV.
1371, 1418 (1998). See generally ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD (1932).
158. See JONATHAN GLOVER, WHAT SORT OF PEOPLE SHOULD THERE BE? 38 (1984);
Cloning Position Paper of the IT Institute For Science, Law and Technology Working
Group On Reproductive Technologies, 8 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L. J. 87, 98 (1998); Robertson,
supra note 157, at 1415.
159. See, e.g., George J. Annas, Human Cloning: A Choice Or An Echo, 23 U. DAYTON
L. REV. 247, 251 (referring to the design of such "parahumans).
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ity, then whatever their creators do, however horrifying, cannot
directly violate the Kantian dignitary formula of ends.
In short, it might not be wrong to fail to treat such stunted
clones as persons, precisely because they are not persons, and in
a sense never were potential persons. However, this possibility
does not leave the orthodox Kantian with nothing to say regard-
ing moral criticism of such a practice. Kant says, for example,
that we have no genuine and direct moral duty toward non-
human animals incapable of moral reasoning. 6 ° But Kant explic-
itly recognizes that how we treat animals may come to affect, for
good or ill, how we treat persons to whom we obviously do owe di-
rect moral duties.' 6 '
Just as we might come to owe an indirect moral duty not to
mistreat non-human animals, we might have indirect moral du-
ties toward clones incapable of personhood, and more broadly
with respect to the institutional practice of generating clones. If it
turns out to be possible to initiate, let alone restore, rational ca-
pacities in the stunted clones, we may have a moral duty in that
respect as well. 62
In any event, one should consider how human cloning, the
above abuses aside, might well highlight, rather than undermine,
Kant's conception of human dignity. Human cloning seems to
threaten the values of distinctiveness, individuality, and unique-
ness. Such threats may or may not prove genuine. However, fo-
cusing on such threats may cause us to overlook the fact that dig-
nity in the Kantian sense is not a matter of individual
distinctiveness. Dignity in the Kantian sense is not something we
have because we are each special and unique;163 rather, it is
something we have that is widely shared."6
Quite apart from, and perhaps contrary to, popular expecta-
tions' 6' human cloning may, in the long run, set off and highlight
160. See IMANUEL KANT, LECTURES ON ETHICS 239-41 (Louis Infield trans., 1963)
(1775-1780) [hereinafter KANT, LECTURES].
161 See id.
162. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
163. See Ted Peters, Cloning Shock A Theological Reaction, in HUMAN CLONING:
RELIGIOUS RESPONSES, supra note 156, at 12, 22 ("It is not individuality or identity per se
that constitutes a person's dignity. Uniqueness does not determine dignity.").
164. See supra notes 19-28 and accompanying text.
165. See, e.g., G. W. F. HEGEL, REASON IN HISTORY: A GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO THE
PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 43-44 (Robert S. Hartman trans., 1953) (1837) (discussing "the
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the ultimately mysterious 66 Kantian capacities that comprise our
being as ends in ourselves.6 7 There is dignity in the Kantian
sense only if we are not, in all valid senses and from all legitimate
perspectives, reducible to our electrochemical, biological, and
random outcome-generating parts.6 " Even the most sophisticated
organic machine possesses only a price, not a dignity.'69
Human cloning has the potential to help us work through the
psychologically difficult task of recognizing that our superficial
differences are, in fact, superficial. Human dignity is not a matter
of desirable eye color, desirable height, better than average ath-
letic ability, a special facility with foreign languages, a unique fa-
cial appearance, or of each person having his own distinctive set
of genes. Instead, human dignity lies in the common but utterly
mysterious process of genuinely free rational decision-making, 7 '
a process which a benevolently created and benevolently raised
clone would be as capable of as we are. The practice of human
cloning, and our contemplation of its practice, might help us fur-
cunning of Reason").
166. Cf. DAVID J. CHALMERS, THE CONSCIOUS MIND: IN SEARCH OF A FUNDAMENTAL
THEORY 3-5 (1996). Chalmers argues, for example, that
consciousness is surprising. If all we knew about were the facts of physics,
and even the facts about dynamics and information processing in complex
systems, there would be no compelling reason to postulate the existence of
conscious experience. If it were not for our direct evidence in the first-person
case, the hypothesis would seem unwarranted; almost mystical, perhaps.
Id. at 5.
167. Cf. Elliot N. Dorff, Human Cloning: A Jewish Perspective, 8 S. CAL. INTERDISC.
L.J. 117, 120 (1998) ("Cloning... will, if it is ever effected, produce independent human
beings with histories and influences all their own and with their own free will.").
168. The rational, and specifically moral, freedom upon which our dignity is based re-
quires that our moral decisions somehow be based in reason itself and in some sense moti-
vated by respect for universal reason, as distinct from any sort of natural causal impulse
or natural causal determination. See KANT, CRITIQUE, supra note 96, at 76. Kant famously
observes that any lesser sort of freedom, of a non-absolute, merely psychological sort
"would at bottom be nothing better than the freedom of a turnspit, which, when once it is
wound up, also accomplishes its movements of itself." Id. at 82; see also GUYER, supra note
43, at 152-53; ROGER SCRUTON, KANT 64-66 (1982) (explaining Kant's position on the re-
lationship between the individual and morality); RALPH WALKER, KANT 55 (1999) (explain-
ing that to be unable to act not merely in accordance with, but out of respect for, the law
would be to limit ourselves to automata or mechanical figures).
169. See KANT, GROUNDWORK, supra note 1, at 42 ("What is related to general human
inclinations and needs has a market price;.., but that which constitutes the condition
under which anything can be an end in itself has not merely a relative worth, that is, a
price, but has an inner worth, that is, dignity.").
170. Kant recognizes that we shall never be able to comprehend how freedom is possi-
ble. Id. at 55. For merely one instance of Kant's struggling with the relationship between
freedom and natural causal necessity, and between the intelligible and the sensible world,
see id. at 118-31, and DICKENS, supra note 81, at 70.
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ther identify what is merely superficial, and what is essential, to
human dignity.17
1
E. Kantian Ends and a Legal Requirement of the Rescue of
Persons
The Kantian formula of persons as ends in themselves, along
with related elements of Kantian moral and legal theory, speak to
the uneasiness of the American law on legally mandated rescues.
Let us focus first not at the level of abstraction, but with the well-
known case of Yania v. Bigan.
17 1
The underlying events in Yania occurred on September 25,
1957, in a strip-mining area of Somerset County, Pennsylvania.
7 3
Yania and Bigan were apparently not competitors, but rather
friendly fellow strip-mine operators. 74 Yania and Boyd Ross ar-
rived at Bigan's property in order to discuss business. 75 Bigan
asked the two men to help him start a water drainage pump. 6
The pump was connected to a large trench which was filled to a
depth of eight to ten feet with water, with an embankment or side
wall sixteen to eighteen feet in height.17 Yania jumped from the
enbankment and drowned in the trench. 7 8 Yania's survivors,
plaintiffs in this action, alleged that Bigan caused Yania, by
means of "urging, enticing, taunting, and inveigling,"179 to jump
into the water trench. Yania was thirty-three years old and "in
full possession of his mental faculties at the time he jumped."80
171. There is a rapidly growing literature devoted to the morality and possible legal
regulation of human cloning. See, e.g., CLONES AND CLONES: FACTS AND FANTASIES ABOUT
HuMAN CLONING (Martha C. Nussbaum & Cass R. Sunstein eds., 1998); ETHICAL ISSUES
IN HUMAN CLONING (Michael C. Brannigan ed., 2001); LEON R. KASs & JAMES Q. WILSON,
THE ETHICS OF HUMAN CLONING (1998); GREGORY E. PENCE, WHO'S AFRAID OF HUMAN
CLONING? (1998); Gilbert Meilaender, Cloning in Protestant Perspective, 32 VAL. U. L.
REV. 707 (1998); R. George Wright, Second Thoughts: How Human Cloning Can Promote
Human Dignity, 35 VAL. U. L. REV. 1 (2000).
172. 155 A.2d 343 (Pa. 1959).
173. Id. at 344.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 345 n.1.
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The court held that mere taunting, cajolery, or verbal entice-
ment of a person, unlike a case involving a young child or men-
tally disabled person, could not constitute actionable negligence
on the part of Bigan' 8' because any danger posed by the trench
was as evident to Yania as to Bigan.8 2
The court then took note of, what for us is the essential matter,
the possible existence and scope of any legal duty to rescue an-
other person.183 The court concluded:
The mere fact that Bigan saw Yania in a position of peril in the wa-
ter imposed upon him no legal, although a moral, obligation or duty
to go to his rescue unless Bigan was legally responsible, in whole or
in part, for placing Yania in the perilous position .... The complaint
does not aver any facts which impose upon Bigan legal responsibility
for placing Yania in the dangerous position in the water and, absent
such legal responsibility, the law imposes on Bigan no duty of res-
184cue.
The rather brief opinion in Yania offers no extended defense of
the general no-legal-duty-to-rescue rule.
Arguably, the opinion is not as forthcoming about some rele-
vant facts as it might have been. For example, what were the acts
or omissions of Mr. Ross, the gentleman who accompanied Yania?
Were any of Bigan's employees present or accessible? Was any po-
tential rescue device, such as a rope or wire, reasonably avail-
able? Was there any place to attach such a rescue device? Was the
water temperature such as to limit the time realistically available
for a rescue? Was Yania at all injured by his jump? Was he con-
scious at all times? Could Yania, Bigan, Ross, or any other rele-
vant person swim? Did the height and steepness of the sidewall of
the trench make any jump into the trench equally risky? Would a
person attempting a rescue by jumping in be placing themself
into a position of peril hardly better off than that of Yania him-
self?
It is possible to argue that under the circumstances, some spe-
cial relationship should have been found to exist between Yania
and Bigan. For the purpose of this article, however, it is more
181. Id. at 345.
182. Id. at 344-46.
183. Id. at 346.
184. Id.
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useful to examine the case, and possible variations therein, with-
out assuming any sort of relevant special relationship between
Yania and Bigan.8 5 Thus, it will be assumed that there are two
Kantian ends in themselves, in a natural and social context of
some complexity. 8
6
Kant actually says much that is arguably relevant to a moral
or legal duty to rescue, but little that can directly and uncontro-
versially decide Yania's legal case. An examination of Kant's fa-
mous fourth illustration of one of his alternative formulas of the
categorical moral imperative is helpful. '7
Kant sets up his fourth illustration by referring to a person
who is flourishing, but who sees others who have to struggle with
great hardships (and whom he could easily help), and he thinks:
What does it matter to me? I won't deprive him of anything...
only I have no wish to contribute anything to his well-being or to
his support in distress.' Kant's view is that such a policy could
not be consistently willed by a person to hold as a universal prac-
tice over all time, regardless of the person's own circumstances.8 9
On some occasions, such a rule would, Kant assumes, result in
the suffering or death of the person initially willing in this fash-
ion.
A rich and secure person who expects to remain rich and secure
may calculate that he or she may be likely to lose more by having
to perform nearly risk-free and costless rescues of nearby strang-
ers than he or she realistically stands to gain from others, given
the extreme unlikeliness of such a person ever requiring a gratui-
tous rescue. To avoid such problems, John Rawls originally
adopted certain constraints on choosing basic rules of justice,
such as the veil of ignorance 90 and a maximin choice strategy. 191
185. The courts have often cited WILIAm PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 56 (4th ed. 1971), for both the general no-legal-duty-to-rescue rule, and for possible sorts
of relevant special relationships.
186. Again, because of the legal logic and brevity of the opinion, we are left to speculate
about a number of considerations relevant to a moral, and perhaps even to a legal, duty to
rescue.
187. See KANT, GROUNDWORK, supra note 1, at 33.
188. Id.
189. See id.; see also ALLEN D. ROSEN, KANT'S THEORY OF JUSTICE 199-201 (1993) (ex-
plaining Kanes theory of the rational and self-integrated man).
190. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 12 (1971).
19L See id. at 75-83; John Rawls, Some Reasons For the Maximin Criterion, Am.
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One can add to the persuasiveness of Kant's account by assum-
ing that he is asking that the choice be made to cover all times
and places, and not merely beginning now, when the chooser may
know himself or herself to be permanently secure. A rich and se-
cure person, particularly of advanced age, might well opt for a no-
morally-required-riskless, low-cost rescues-of-strangers rule. 92
Such a rule might seem less attractive, however, if it were also to
be applied backwards through history-perhaps including the
rescue, or non-rescue, of some of the chooser's own non-rich an-
cestors, or even the chooser as a small child.
As they stand, both the Yania case and Kant's fourth illustra-
tion are complex and murky enough to prevent simply applying
the latter to the former. We are unsure of the power and convic-
tion of the latter, especially in cases where the potential rescuer
is unlikely to need similar assistance in the future.
Some progress can be made, however, if we simplify, and in-
deed materially change, the circumstances in Yania. Simply as-
sume that the defendant Bigan was the only possible rescuer of
Yania, and that Bigan knew that he could have rescued Yania,
perhaps by throwing an attached rope, at little cost or risk to
himself. These assumptions make the proper moral outcome
clear. The argument is strengthened if one assumes that Yania
has not taken Bigan's proximity into account in leaping into the
water.
That proper moral outcome in this revised Yania case is clear,
however, does not mean that Kant's fourth illustration above
makes it clear. If it is to be explained why Bigan should rescue
Yania, the best bet may not be to emphasize any likelihood that
Bigan himself may one day want to be rescued. Any such ap-
proach seems unnecessarily indirect and not entirely candid. The
real reason Bigan would be morally required to rescue Yania re-
minds us of the positive Golden Rule, but is ultimately most
deeply accounted for by Kant's formula of ends.
ECON. REV., May 1974, at 141. While the veil of ignorance is intended to allow our basic
choices of rules of justice to take place untainted by improper considerations, the maximin
strategy emphasizes avoiding disastrous possible outcomes, even at some cost in what we
might most likely have obtained.
192. The reference to "strangers" is merely awkward shorthand for the various condi-
tions which Kant, other theorists, or the law might build regarding a moral duty to rescue
relatives, those whom we have helped place in peril, or on various forms of contractual and
other special relationships. See supra note 185.
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The simplest and best account of why Bigan morally ought to
rescue Yania, within the Kantian framework, is that Yania is an
end in himself, a person, a locus of incomparable worth beyond
price, if of imperfect rationality. However, it is easy to be misled if
Yania's higher cognitive powers are unduly emphasized at the
expense of recognizing that the exercise of those powers presup-
poses that Yania is alive, and not drowned. Before anything else,
in this sense, the case is a matter of life and death.'93 If Yania is
to continue to exercise the powers and capacities of personhood,
he must still be alive.
This is not to deny Kant's account of the moral value of a per-
son. It is merely to point out that there must be a person who re-
mains alive to continue to exercise the higher Kantian capacities.
In our revised hypothetical, Bigan must save Yania if Yania's
valuable capacities are to be saved.
Under our revised circumstances, it would violate a Kantian
moral duty for Bigan to refuse to save Yania without some ade-
quate excuse. The problem is that it cannot be assumed that all
moral duties can and should be legally enforced on every occa-
sion.'94 Not all of the differences between law and morality will be
crucial in all cases. The law, for example, cannot force Bigan to
rescue Yania with just the right motive.'95 But about this, one can
safely assume that Yania is largely indifferent, so long as the res-
cue goes ahead successfully. The motive of the rescuer, whatever
its moral value, is unlikely to loom large to the rescued.
Crucially, the law may take proper account of both the com-
plex, multi-faceted, actual Yania-type situations, and of the re-
vised simplified context as well. The law may sensibly take all the
possible complications under consideration-the impossible calcu-
lations, the dangers to a rescuer, administrative costs, moral haz-
ards, the diffusion of responsibility, costs to rescuers, the uncer-
tainties, and even the incentive effects on good swimmers to avoid
193. For discussion, see ROSEN, supra note 189, at 207 (defining survival, or life itself,
as presupposed by higher values, including liberty).
194. See, e.g., KANT, METAPHYSICS, supra note 5, at 22 ("[Moral] duties of benevolence,
even though they are external duties (obligations to external actions), are still assigned to
ethics (as opposed to enforceable positive law) because their lawgiving can only be inter-
nal.").
195. See id at 21 (explaining that juridical or positive "lawgiving does not require that
the idea of this duty, which is internal, itself be the determining ground of the agent's
choice").
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water-and may refuse to establish a general legal rule of res-
cue.
196
That does not mean, however, that the law should not impose a
legal duty to rescue for cases as recognizably simple and clear as
our revised hypothetical. Likewise, it certainly does not mean
that the law cannot require "benevolent" acts in general, whether
such acts are really motivated by benevolence or not. 97 The law
can require rescues even if the rescuer is motivated solely by fear
of punishment for noncompliance. For Kant, this is because the
positive, juridical law is instrumental to 198 and constrained by 99
the Kantian moral law. After all, in the absence of Kantian free-
dom and autonomy people would, according to Kant, merely be
fancy mechanisms or complex natural objects, and there would be
little reason for the law not to subtly manipulate us as objects.200
Clearly, Kant wishes to emphasize individual freedom of
choice, individual liberties, and pursuing one's own happiness
196. For discussions of some of the main complications, see, e.g., Samuel Freeman,
Criminal Liability and the Duty to Aid the Distressed, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1455, 1473
(1994) (referring to a Kantian "perfect juridical duty of commission" to relieve emergency
distress if we can do so at little risk and inconvenience); Steven J. Heyman, Foundations
of the Duty to Rescue, 47 VAND. L. REV. 673, 705-06, 746 (1994) (seeking to develop a
Kantian legal duty of individual rescue, where the broader community cannot itself act,
based on a Kantian social-contractarian/communitarian obligation to preserve persons
through providing necessary sustenance, etc.); Liam Murphy, Beneficence, Law, and Lib-
erty: The Case of Required Rescue; 89 GEo. L.J. 605, 606-08 (2001) (arguing for the limited
significance of the problem of limiting liberty, as opposed to broader cost considerations);
Eugene Volokh, Duties to Rescue and the Anticooperative Effects of Law, 88 GEO. L.J. 105,
106-07 (1999) (discussing several more specific variants among good and bad Samaritans);
Jeremy Waldron, On the Road: Good Samaritans and Compelling Duties, 40 SANTA CLARA
L. REV. 1053, 1056-57 (2000) (emphasizing the possible justifiability of legal duties in this
context, without relying on communitarianism or merely abstract universalism); Ernest J.
Weinrib, The Case for a Duty to Rescue, 90 YALE L.J. 247 (1980) (arguing that a judicially
created duty to rescue can be justified based on an already-existing pattern of morality in
the common law); Richard A. Epstein, Rights and Rights Talk, 105 HARv. L. REV. 1106,
1117-18 (1992) (reviewing MARY ANN GLEDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERmisHMENT OF
POLITICAL DISCOURSE (1991)) (noting the various enforcement and administrative costs
associated with making some failures to rescue a crime or tort).
197. Cf KANT, METAPHYSICS, supra note 5, at 22 (emphasizing benevolence' in a sense
including an appropriate motive, as opposed to merely doing the benevolent thing, from
whatever motive); see also ROSEN, supra note 189, at 179 (discussing both private citizens'
and the government's duties of benevolence).
198. See PATRICK RILEY, WILL AND POLITICAL LEGITIMACY: A CRITICAL EXPOSrTION OF
SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY IN HOBBES, LOCKE, ROUSSEAU, KANT AND HEGEL 128-29
(1982). A moral duty not to murder hardly rules out the possibility that a no-murder rule
should also be enforced at law.
199. See id. at 128.
200. See id.
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generally in his or her own way.20 ' Such individual freedom im-
poses limits upon what governments can legally require. It cannot
be assumed that these considerations, along with all the problems
associated with real-world rescue adjudication, could not leave
Kant with something like the general American no-rescue rule.2 °2
This is a matter of some moral and empirical complexity.2
3
Critically, it may be morally permissible, or even required, for
a government to legally require citizens to contribute directly or
indirectly to the essential well-being of others. In some cases,
there may be no real difference between a government's imposing
a direct legal obligation on some or all citizens, and the govern-
ment's supplementing private charity through compulsory taxa-
tion.20
4
Whatever a Kantian government may legitimately require
about rescues by private parties, it was noted in Part II that Kant
endorses the more indirect, more collective "rescue" of persons in
the form of tax-financed redistribution to the least well-off. It is to
the elaboration of this crucial theme that this article now turns.
20 5
201. See KANT, METAPHYSICS, supra note 5, at 30 (explaining the innate right of free-
dom and independence consistent with like rights for others); id. at 151 (explaining that
the duty to promote the happiness of others is largely constrained by their own prefer-
ences).
202. See, e.g., Miller v. Arnal Corp., 632 P.2d 987, 990 (Ariz. 1981) ("IT]he law pres-
ently imposes no liability upon those who stand idly by and fail to rescue a stranger who is
in danger."). There are, of course, exceptions and statutory limitations. See id. For a recent
repudiation of the majority rule, in dicta, see Wicker v. Harmony Corp., 784 So. 2d 660,
664 (La. Ct. App. 2001) ("[A] person who observes a person in obvious peril should be re-
quired to render assistance when he can do so without personal risk."). The Vermont res-
cue statute requires reasonable assistance under specified circumstances. VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12, § 519(a) (1973).
203. Kant is certainly sensitive to practical problems in implementing what may seem
like sound general rules. See, e.g., KANT, METAPHYSICS, supra note 5, at 156 (recognizing
moral indeterminacies at least at the level of particular cases, if not at the level of princi-
ples, and the need for moral judgment in cases of charity and sacrifice).
204. See id. at 101 for Kant's discussion of compulsory poor support. Certainly, requir-
ing person A to rescue person B differs in some respects from the government's allocating
a portion of A's taxes to fund rescue personnel. It is difficult, however, to see a legal re-
quirement that we warn the blind of an imminent, disastrous misstep, or that we annually
cook some sort of dinner for distribution to the hungry, as so much more personally intru-
sive and autonomy inference-laden as to make our tax contributions seem qualitatively
less by comparison. Paying a tax obviously leaves one with less discretion and autonomy
as well.
205. See id. at 202-03.
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F. A Formula-of-Ends Approach to Welfare and Educational
Systems
As devoted as he was to individual liberty, 6 Kant's recognition
of the status of all persons as ends in themselves leads naturally
to his conclusion that governments can and should tax the
wealthy in order to provide for the most basic natural needs, in-
cluding sustenance itself, of those unable to provide for them-
selves.2 °7
Kant's own explicit logic is contractarian, but his underlying
logic should be one of universality, reason, and intrinsic worth.
Kant, referring to a hypothetical social contract, says explicitly:
The general will of the people has united itself into a society which is
to maintain itself perpetually; and for this it has submitted itself to
the internal authority of the state in order to maintain those mem-
bers of the society who are unable to maintain themselves. For rea-
sons of state the government is therefore authorized to constrain the
wealthy to provide the means of sustenance to those who are unable
to provide for even their most necessary natural needs. The wealthy
have acquired an obligation to the commonwealth, since they owe
their existence to an act of submitting to its protection and
208
care ....
This provision sounds rather minimalist on its face. Beyond the
literal minimalism, though, lie the passage's ambiguities.
The quoted passage is minimalist in that its focus seems to be
on sheer survival, or at least compatible with fulfilling the most
necessary natural needs. Certainly, Kant is not writing in a pe-
riod of enormous technological and economic productivity with
oceans of dispensable consumer goods.2"9 Perhaps Kant intends
this passage to set only a minimum floor. However, it is written
with a focus on providing, not so much for the rational capacities
206. See id. at 24 ("Any action is right if it can coexist with everyone's freedom in ac-
cordance with a universal law, or if on its maxim the freedom of choice of each can coexist
with everyone's freedom in accordance with a universal law."); id. at 30 ("Freedom (inde-
pendence from being constrained by another's choice), insofar as it can coexist with the
freedom of every other in accordance with a universal law, is the only original right be-
longing to every man by virtue of his humanity.").
207. See id. at 101.
208. Id. To evaluate the influence of Rousseau on Kant and on his terminology, see
generally JEAN JAcQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SocIAL CONTRACT (Maurice Cranston trans.,
Penguin 1972) (1762).
209. See JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY (4th ed. 1984).
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or the truly human, but for providing for humans at a level not
really much above the animal.
There is also the ambiguity of who, within the community, is
really to be provided for, and whether the obligation stems from a
sense of fairness and obligation by the rich, or from mere reasons
of state. One might well assume that everyone who genuinely
cannot provide for their most basic necessities would qualify for
government assistance.2 0 However, Kant seems to hint that
merely maintaining society, or social stability, is really the under-
lying aim. Perhaps for reasons of state, no provision by the state
need be made to those unfortunately destitute and who are no
longer able, in any way, to threaten social stability. Those who
are both unable to work and unable to threaten social stability
can be left to private charity. Perhaps Kant is assuming that, at
least indirectly, all those who need state welfare, including the
helpless and infirm, can somehow threaten social stability.
This may be as far as Kant's hypothetical social contract theory
can carry the argument for legally-backed redistribution in favor
of the least well off. In any case, the logic of Kant's own basic
moral concepts actually carries further into the legal or juridical
realm than Kant seems to allow.
In our world, the things that Kant values most highly require
various kinds of assistance if they are to be uniformly developed
and preserved. The potential for rational decision-making, for
testing the universalizability of possible moral principles, the ex-
ercise of moral judgment, autonomy itself, and the dignity associ-
ated with these capacities do not necessarily flourish without
governmental assistance. Taxation or other forms of coercion un-
derlying such governmental provisions do not necessarily mean
that someone's rights have thereby been violated. Kant himself
might grant at least this."
The most fundamental reason why taxing one person to sup-
port another need not violate the first person's rights is a matter
of each person being equally an end in his or her own right, and of
210. For a strikingly less restrictive alternative conception, setting no requirement of
reasonable effort to be or become productive for the receipt of an unconditional income
grant from the government, see generally WHAT'S WRONG WITH A FREE LUNcH? (Philippe
Van Parijs et al. eds., 2001); Philippe Van Parijs, Why Surfers Should Be Fed. The Liberal
Case for an Unconditional Basic Income, 20 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 101 (1991).
211. See KANT, METAPHYSICS, supra note 5, at 101.
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incomparable value. The government cannot treat taxpayers
merely as means to the good end of preserving and promoting the
basic capacities of others. However, those who are most able to
pay, within some vague limits,212 are under a moral duty to do so.
Within limits, they have no moral right to refuse when required
to do so.21 3 Kantian political freedom cannot be read to override
our genuine, fundamental, preexisting moral duties where those
duties apply.
We have seen that not every instance of moral duty should be
translated into a coercive law.214 Some core moral requirements
should, however, with great prudence, be translated into positive
law. What we might call the socially available material and cul-
tural bases of developing and preserving Kantian personhood,
with equal consideration for all persons, should be made widely
available. If necessary, this wide, if not universal, availability
should occur through the enforcement of law.
Nature, a functioning economy, and private charity may not
ensure that the material and cultural bases of developing and
preserving personhood are widely available. Affirmative steps of
various sorts may be needed if we are to preserve and promote
our autonomy and our latent capacity for rational moral choice.21 5
The well off among us cannot claim that their own developed ca-
pacity for autonomy is important, but that the same capacity in
the least well off is not.216 Kantian capacities are something that
are common to us,217 though developed to different degrees and in
different ways in all of us.
212. See id. at 156.
But I ought to sacrifice a part of my welfare to others without hope of return,
because this is a duty, and it is impossible to assign determinate limits to the
extent of this sacrifice. How far it should extend depends, in large part, on
what each person's true needs are ....
Id.
213. See id.
214. For the complexities of enforcing a moral duty to rescue, see supra Part 1V.E.
215. See GUYER, supra note 43, at 131 ("[Siteps must be taken to preserve our potential
for free choice and action and to enhance the conditions under which we exercise our
agency.").
216. See id. at 149 ("[O]ne... has a duty to do what one can do to advance the success-
ful exercise of rational agency in oneself and others .... ."); see also supra notes 163-64 and
accompanying text.
217. This equality is, of course, paralleled by Kant's equal concern for others and for
oneself in the formula of ends. See supra text accompanying note 1.
2002] LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF A KANTIAN PRINCIPLE 317
Kantian governments need not infringe upon anyone's moral
rights, nor act paternalistically toward the least well off, when
they coercively tax in order to promote the basic well-being, dig-
nity, and autonomy of the least well off.218 While autonomy itself
cannot be simply transferred or given intact by private benefac-
tors or by a government, the necessary material and cultural
bases of autonomy can and should be transferred.219
Certainly, some people will resist the idea of a moral and legal
duty to non-paternalistically assist those who lack the basic req-
uisites for developing their rational capacities. Charles Dickens
wrote of the mixed feelings toward "the multitude of Coketown,
generically called 'e Hands,'-a race who would have found
more favour with some people, if Providence had seen fit to make
them only hands, or, like the lower creatures of the sea-shore,
only hands and stomachs."22 °
Even if the government cannot directly alter such attitudes, it
properly implements the formula of ends when it uses tax funds
to promote the formula of ends in practice.22' Of course, just as
private individuals must exercise some discretionary judgment in
carrying out their moral duty of sacrifice for the benefit of oth-
ers,222 so governments must recognize some reasonable limits on
the scope of promoting dignity and autonomy through taxation.
Even if, as Kant imagines, the capacity for human development is
218. See ROSEN, supra note 189, at 204-06. Making basic opportunities for rational
choice available to the poor should not count as any sort of paternalism. See id. at 196.
Rather, introducing such basic opportunities available to those who previously lacked
them may reasonably be said to be crucially liberating. One could at worst say that only
now, with the capacities for Kantian choice fully in place, could the conflict between pa-
ternalism and the exercise of their own autonomy even arise for such persons.
219. Cf RAWLS, supra note 12, at 234. Rawls refers to a Kantian need "for those condi-
tions necessary to develop and exercise our capacity for rationality in order to advance our
happiness," whatever that conception of happiness may be. Id. (citing HERIMAN, supra note
15, at 55-72).
220. DICKENS, supra note 81, at 52. By contrast, consider the sensible observation of
Professor David Braybrooke that "[pleople can function without derangement even at work
that is far from satisfying. All along, however, it is indispensable to their full development
that they have opportunities at work to enlarge their views, test their talents, and attain a
sense of significant accomplishment." DAvID BRAYBROOKE, MEETING NEEDS 249 (1987).
22L See ROSEN, supra note 189, at 191-92.
222. See KANT, METAPHYSICS, supra note 5, at 156. "How far should one expend one's
resources in practicing beneficence? Surely not to the extent that he himself would finally
come to need the beneficence of others." Id. at 202. Some fixed rules in this regard might
also encourage moral complacency, which Kant wants us to avoid. See MARCIA W. BARON,
KANTIAN ETHICS ALiOST WITHOUT APOLOGY 41-43 (1995).
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itself limitless,223 the proper scope of taxation to support the de-
velopment of such capacities is not.224
Promoting the rational capacities of human beings requires not
only the materials for a minimally civilized life, but opportunities
for an appropriate education. Education is closely linked to ra-
tional development, the exercise of autonomy, and the fullest ex-
pression of human dignity. Treating all persons as ends in them-
selves requires the provision of educational opportunities, at
public expense if necessary.225 Given the crucial status of one's ra-
tional capacities and the ability to arrive at moral principles in
particular, it is not surprising that Kant regards education as of
central importance.
Kant is explicit on the status of education:
A man may postpone for himself, but only for a short time, enlighten-
ing himself regarding what he ought to know. But to resign from
such enlightenment altogether either for his own person or even
more for his descendants means to violate and to trample underfoot
the sacred rights of mankind.
226
Education for Kant is not merely a matter of individual sacred
right. Just as we, individually and collectively, are in this crucial
respect to treat one another as ends in ourselves, so nature her-
self seems to intend the flourishing of human rational capacities.
Kant writes that "[t]he history of mankind could be viewed on the
whole as the realization of a hidden plan of nature to bring about
an internally, and for this also externally, perfect constitution;
223. Hannah Arendt writes that for Kant, "[tihe human species is distinguished from
all animal species not merely by its possession of speech and reason but because its facul-
ties are capable of indeterminable development." HANNAH ARENDT, LECTURES ON KANT'S
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 59 (Ronald Beiner ed., 1982).
224. For private sphere morality, Kant recognizes that the true needs of the benefactor
must be considered along with those of the recipient. See KANT, METAPHYSICS, supra note
5, at 156.
225. See ROSEN, supra note 189, at 193 (noting that, for Kant, the state should "bear
the expense of educating its subjects"); see also IMMANUEL KANT, Idea for a Universal His-
tory with Cosmopolitan Intent, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF KANT: IMMANUEL KANT'S MORAL
AND POLITICAL WRITINGS 116, 126 (Carl J. Friedrich ed. and trans., Random House 1949)
(1784) (referring critically to military rather than public educational spending).
226. IMMANUEL KANT, What Is Enlightenment?, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF KANT:
IMMANUEL KANT'S MORAL AND POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 225, at 132, 137. Even
more basically, Kant argues that "[mian can only become man by education. He is merely
what education makes of him." IMMANUEL KANT, EDUCATION 6 (Annette Churten trans.,
U. Michigan Press ed., 1960) (1803).
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since this is the only state in which nature can develop all facul-
ties of mankind."
221
It would be tempting to imagine that Kant's relevance in this
respect has been eclipsed. Twenty-first Century schools are typi-
cally unlike Eighteenth Century educational systems and prac-
tices. Have we not by now faithfully and fully implemented
Kant's strictures on the importance of education, publicly funded
where appropriate?
In fact, there is today an enormous gulf between Kant's vision
of the universal development of human rational capacity and
autonomy through education and the astonishing state of disre-
pair-the almost Dantesque conditions-of some of our public
schools. The Kantian vision cannot be implemented by concen-
trating our supportive cultural and economic forces on favored
schools, while the rest either scramble at the margins or fall into
nightmarish conditions. Too often, our schools are dramatically
lacking in those material and cultural prerequisites to the devel-
opment of Kantian autonomy that could be publicly provided.
Beyond the endlessly debated disparities in public funding
among school district lie, within some schools, abject squalor and
depredation at the most concrete level. The typical impact of such
conditions on the development of Kantian autonomy, and its in-
compatibility with genuine Kantian respect for persons and their
potential, is similarly undeniable.
Consider briefly the report of the former schoolteacher Jona-
than Kozol on his tour of a limited number of some of our worst
public school facilities.228 Kozol reports repeated instances of taxis
refusing to take him to a particular school;2 9 cases of lead poison-
ing among students detected too late to prevent permanent brain
damage;" ° students in constant, long-term pain from bleeding
gums, or impacted or rotting teeth;23' raw sewage flowing
throughout the school, including the cafeteria;23 2 chronic lack of
227. KANT, supra note 225, at 116, 127.
228. JONATHAN KOZOL, SAVAGE INEQUALITIES: CHILDREN IN AMERICA'S SCHOOLS
(1991).
229. See id. at 5.
230. Id. at 11.
231. Id. at 20.
232. Id. at 23. Cf. DANTE ALiGHIERI, THE INFERNO Canto VI, Circle 3, at 66 (John Ci-
ardi trans., New Am. Library 1954) (1314) ("[Dhirty water, and black snow/pour from the
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the most basic educational materials;2 33 class hours spent regu-
larly doing basic room cleaning; classes with no teacher pre-
sent; or where no teaching is being attempted;23 5 or where the
teacher is sleeping in class;236 four of six toilets non-functional,
and others seatless;2 7 numerous school window frames with no
glass;238 urinals detectable from one hundred feet away;239 library
books sprouting mold;240 ceiling paint chips continually falling
like snow; 4 cracking blackboards literally too dangerous to
use;' virtual indoor waterfalls from leaking ceilings; 24 3 substan-
tial holes in the floor;2" wild mushrooms growing on the floor; 5
classrooms with more children than desks;246 classes held in bath-
rooms;247 a fire alarm that has remained non-functional for
248 dedr149twenty years; and dead rats found in the school cafeteria.
One may believe that these sorts of public school conditions are
somehow rare, that they can be overcome by some individual stu-
dents, that they really do not make much difference, or that they
are in a way consented to by the affected communities, that there
is nothing that can realistically be done, or that it would be un-
fairly redistributive to remedy these nightmarish conditions. Cer-
dismal air to putrefy/the putrid slush that waits for them below.").
233. See KOZOL, supra note 228, at 24.
234. Id. at 27.
235. Id. at 33, 69.
236. Id. at 52.
237. Id. at 36.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 37.
240. Id. at 53.
241. Id. at 99.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 100.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 105.
246. Id. at 111.
247. Id. at 114.
248. Id. at 140.
249. Id. at 182. For a less vividly expressed but in other respects parallel tour, see
PAULO FREIRE, PEDAGOGY OF FREEDOM: ETHICS, DEMOCRACY, AND CIVIC COURAGE (1998),
stating:
On my first visits to the [Sao Paulo] city schools, I saw the calamity with my
own eyes and I was terrified. The whole system was a disaster, from the state
of the buildings and the classrooms to the quality of the teaching. How was it
possible to ask of the children the minimum of respect for their material sur-
roundings when the authorities demonstrated such absolute neglect of and
indifference to the public institutions under their care?
Id. at 48.
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tainly, it is difficult to believe that such school conditions can be
separated from the difficult circumstances and limited opportuni-
ties of the broader deprived community. All of this is beside the
point; the Kantian dignitary agenda was plainly not completed
with the close of the Enlightenment, or even with whatever fad-
dish programmatic, structural, or administrative reforms may be
currently popular. The Kantian dignitary agenda is, in the abso-
lutely central area of education, as yet unfulfilled.
In such schools, it is difficult for observers to avoid something
like basic Kantian considerations in assessing the situation. For
example, one school counselor has remarked:
It's quite remarkable how much these children see. You wouldn't
know it from their academic work. Most of them write poorly. There
is a tremendous gulf between their skills and capabilities. This gulf,
this dissonance, is frightening. I mean, it says so much about the
squandering of human worth ....
Kant's central focus is on the opportunity to transform mere la-
tent potential into flourishing competencies. As long as the Kant-
ian vision remains unfulfilled, and human worth is squandered,252
Kant's formula of ends remains a radical insight and a radical
agenda, and not an achievement of the late Eighteenth Century
revolutions.
Regardless of whether the offspring of an economically advan-
taged group of taxpayers is especially talented, many of those
taxpayers prefer to provide their offspring with the largest educa-
tional and career advantages possible.253 Groups with an eco-
nomic advantage can tolerate real inefficiencies in educational
and career sorting unless the overall societal well-being level be-
gins to suffer significantly. Advantaged groups may gain more by
artificially and arbitrarily privileging their own off-
spring-whatever the latter's talents-than they lose from the
overall general welfare losses stemming from limiting the oppor-
tunities of others.
250. See KOZOL, supra note 228, at 123; see also Susan H. Bitensky, Theoretical Foun-
dations for a Right to Education Under the U.S. Constitution: A Beginning to the End of
the National Education Crisis, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 550, 553 n.21 (1992).
251. KOZOL, supra note 228, at 105.
252. See id.
253. For discussion of some tradeoffs between family advantage and equal opportunity,
see generally JAMIES S. FISHKIN, JUSTICE, EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, AND THE FAMILY (1983).
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Kant reminds us of the moral arbitrariness of taking advan-
tage of wealth differentials in this way. Kant notes that "in doing
good to the poor, we are only doing our duty. For the inequality of
man arises only from accidental circumstances-if I possess
wealth, to what do I owe it but to the laying hold of circumstances
favourable to me or my predecessors. "2M According to Kant, there
is no right to withhold the social and material requisites of dig-
nity, particularly in the educational sphere. As contemporary
educational theorist Paulo Freire argued, "[riespect for the auton-
omy and dignity of every person is an ethical imperative and not
a favor that we may or may not concede to each other."255
Kant recognizes that this Enlightenment project may require
special public provision; however, he is flexible as to how the
broad educational project is best carried out institutionally.2 6 For
example, Kant wonders whether education at home or public edu-
cation is more advantageous.2 5 7 He concludes that "from the point
of view of developing ability, [and] also as a preparation for the
duties of a citizen, it must, I am inclined to think, be allowed
that, on the whole, public education is the best."
258
V. A FINAL PROBLEM: THE VALUE OF THE GOOD WILL VERSUS THE
VALUE OF DOING THE RIGHT THING
Above we have discussed governmental provision of the mate-
rial and cultural prerequisites to Kantian dignity and autonomy,
or to developing into an end in oneself. Government provision,
however, is typically a matter of coercing, if only through taxa-
tion, the assistance of taxpayers. It is possible to pay one's taxes
with no regard for duty, or even with resentment. This might not
unduly trouble us, were it not that Kant famously emphasizes the
moral status of the good will.
254. KANT, EDUCATION, supra note 226, at 105.
255. See FREIRE, supra note 249, at 59.
256. See supra note 225 and accompanying text.
257. See KANT, EDUCATION, supra note 226, at 25.
258. Id. at 25-26; cf AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION (1987) (discussing the
value of publicly funded and publicly responsible schools emphasizing the capacity for de-
mocratic deliberation); JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 97-99 (David Spitz ed., W.W. Nor-
ten & Co. 1975) (1859) (discussing the legitimate role of taxation in supporting the educa-
tion of the poor). Note that the Supreme Court has refused to recognize any general
federal constitutional right to some minimum quality or quantity of education. See San
Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 57-59 (1973).
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Kant writes, in particular, that "[i]t is impossible to think of
anything at all... that could be considered as good without limi-
tation except a good will."259 Further, "[a] good will is not good be-
cause of what it effects or accomplishes .... Consider, how-
ever, the possible states of mind of the taxpayer who is legally
coerced by the government into contributing to the status of oth-
ers as ends in themselves. Such a taxpayer may be resentful, un-
aware of any real consequences of his or her contribution, or in-
different to moral duty.
Should we infer that a society should try to promote severely
deprived persons into flourishing ends in themselves only
through voluntary means, such as private charity? Of course,
some people even donate to a charity for reasons of no Kantian
moral value. Perhaps it can be assumed that people typically do-
nate to charity with a morally better, duty-oriented state of mind
than when we pay our tax bill. Doubtless it is often difficult, or
even impossible, to tell if someone has acted on the basis of a good
will or not.2 6' However, we must admit the apparent difference
between a morally backward taxpayer and a charitable donor who
sees his or her contribution as a Kantian moral duty owed toward
a moral person as an end in his or herself.
Still, there is no sufficient reason to put an end to taxation for
the sake of developing personhood in others, as long as we believe
that personhood can often be more adequately promoted through
taxation than by relying on voluntary charity. In the case of edu-
cation, for example, providing young children with a real oppor-
tunity to become genuine Kantian persons in the fullest sense is
obviously of enormous Kantian moral weight. In such a case, so-
ciety is helping to promote the very capacities needed for a Kant-
ian good will in the children benefited. Regardless of the motive,
taxes may make possible what Kant takes to be the enormously,
morally significant transformation into a fully developed moral
person. Without taxes, presumably, this process occurs less often,
or at least to a lesser degree. Coercing the payment of taxes may
result in payment with something less than a good will, from duty
alone.26 2 Surely the substance of such a less-than-good will, and
259. KANT, GROUNDWORK, supra note 1, at 7.
260. Id. at 8.
261. See id. at 19-20.
262. See id. at 10-12.
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even resentment of or indifference toward the deprived, often
preexist the demand by the tax collector.
It is possible that making support of basic genuine education
voluntary would change many persons' moral outlook from malice
or indifference to a new, more responsible seriousness toward
what Kant regards as a moral duty.2' This might amount to a
valuable gain in good will. It is just as easy to argue, however,
that taxation for basic education calls attention to the moral im-
portance of such an educational opportunity, and prompts some
persons to recognize that moral importance and their own moral
duty.
Part of the problem may lie in the fact that we use terms such
as "respect" in both a subjective and an objective sense. A person
who contributes to another's basic genuine education only with
contempt from fear of punishment, or from arbitrary sentimental-
ity, may not have respect for the beneficiary in the subjective
sense of respect. However, there is also an objective sense of re-
spect. In this sense, consciously providing for the development of
another's moral personality is to respect that developing person.
Kant places enormous moral value on even the objective sense
of respect, as even this form of respect promotes the development
of at least the beneficiaries' moral personhood, and the status of
the beneficiaries as ends in themselves. Certainly, the severely
deprived would prefer to be treated with respect in both the objec-
tive and subjective senses. Resentment on the part of the better-
off can be sensed. Given the choice, however, we may easily con-
clude that the beneficiaries of taxation would typically prefer be-
ing given the prerequisites for flourishing as ends in themselves
even by taxpayers indifferent to their moral duty rather than re-
ceive much less under a voluntary but less adequate system.
There may be morally conscientious taxpayers who are dis-
turbed by the fact that the compulsoriness of their tax payments
obscures their good Kantian motives. They may really be moti-
vated by their recognition of moral duty, but others may believe
that they are motivated, at least in part, by fear of punishment.
Thus, they may deserve, but not receive, moral credit.
263. See supra Part IV.F.
20021 LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF A KANTIAN PRINCIPLE 325
We can be sympathetic to such persons, but we should not ac-
commodate their concerns to the extent of making the support of
education entirely voluntary. Even where there is tax support of
education, additional voluntary opportunities to contribute
money, time, or talent are typically available. If one wishes
merely to test one's good will, one can accept these additional op-
portunities. If one wishes public credit for one's good will, one can
volunteer in an especially public manner.2
VI. CONCLUSION
This essay has shown that the basic Kantian concern for the
value of persons as ends in themselves continues to carry impor-
tant critical weight. The basic Kantian project remains unful-
filled. This is true not just for morality, but for the law as well,
especially in the vital realm of welfare and education law. Of
course, as Kant recognizes,265 no broad formula, including the
formula of ends, can be applied without intelligence, good faith,
and sensible judgment. However, society has been able to make
important, critical use in the law of Kant's formula of ends while
minimizing the relevance of typical criticisms of Kant.266
It is possible to differ, particularly over many details of the
educational policy that best reflects proper government enforce-
ment of the imperative to respect and nurture the developing
status of young persons as ends in themselves. Educational prob-
lems in our society certainly cannot be addressed by the schools
alone. Experimentation, rather than dogmatism, is called for.
With these disclaimers in place, however, it remains undeniable
that our present law of school operation and finding, at the fed-
264. For further development of some of these voluntariness themes, see Murphy, su-
pra note 196, at 643 n.179 (2001).
265. See KANT, METAPHYSICS, supra note 5, at 156, 202.
266. See, e.g., 1 ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER, THE WORLD AS WILL AND IDEA 450 (Haldane
& Kemp trans., Kepan, Paul, Trench, Traubert & Co., 7th ed. 1909) (1898) (critizing Kant-
ians for adhering to a proposition that is "an exceedingly vague, indefinite assertion,
which reaches its aim quite indirectly, requires to be explained, defined, and modified in
every case of its application and, if taken generally, is insufficient, meager, and moreover
problematic"); Izhak Englard, Human Dignity: From Antiquity to Modern Israel's Consti-
tutional Framework, 21 CARDOZO L. REv. 1903, 1922 (2000) (referring to Kant's formula-
tions of the categorical imperative as "empty formula[s]"); Robin L. West, Are There Noth-
ing But Texts In This Class?: Interpreting the Interpretive Turns in Legal Thought, 76
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1125, 1160 (2000) (referring to 'the super-rationalism of Kant").
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eral and state constitutional and statutory levels, plainly violates
the status of many students as actual or potential Kantian ends
in themselves. The most basic Kantian principles are, thus, not
simply our inherited legacy, but an unmet challenge.
